/* Copyright 2014 The BoringSSL Authors
 *
 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
 *
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
 * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
 * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
 * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */

#include <openssl/base.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/obj.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include "../../internal.h"
#include "../bcm_interface.h"
#include "address.h"
#include "fors.h"
#include "merkle.h"
#include "params.h"
#include "thash.h"


// The OBJECT IDENTIFIER header is also included in these values, per the spec.
static const uint8_t kSHA256OID[] = {0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01,
                                     0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01};
static const uint8_t kSHA384OID[] = {0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01,
                                     0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02};
#define MAX_OID_LENGTH 11
#define MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH 255

bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(
    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
    uint8_t out_secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]) {
  // Initialize SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed from seed.
  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_secret_key, seed, 3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N);

  // Initialize PK.seed from seed.
  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_public_key, seed + 2 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N,
                 BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N);

  uint8_t addr[32] = {0};
  slhdsa_set_layer_addr(addr, SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_D - 1);

  // Set PK.root
  slhdsa_treehash(out_public_key + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N, out_secret_key, 0,
                  SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_TREE_HEIGHT, out_public_key, addr);
  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_secret_key + 3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N,
                 out_public_key + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N,
                 BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N);
  return bcm_infallible::approved;
}

bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key(
    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
    uint8_t out_private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
  uint8_t seed[3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
  RAND_bytes(seed, 3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N);
  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_generate_key_from_seed(out_public_key, out_private_key,
                                              seed);
  return bcm_infallible::approved;
}

bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_public_from_private(
    uint8_t out_public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES]) {
  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_public_key, private_key + 2 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N,
                 BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N * 2);
  return bcm_infallible::approved;
}

// Note that this overreads by a byte. This is fine in the context that it's
// used.
static uint64_t load_tree_index(const uint8_t in[8]) {
  static_assert(SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_TREE_BYTES == 7,
                "This code needs to be updated");
  uint64_t index = CRYPTO_load_u64_be(in);
  index >>= 8;
  index &= (~(uint64_t)0) >> (64 - SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_TREE_BITS);
  return index;
}

// Implements Algorithm 22: slh_sign function (Section 10.2.1, page 39)
bcm_infallible BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(
    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
    const uint8_t secret_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
    const uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N]) {
  const uint8_t *sk_seed = secret_key;
  const uint8_t *sk_prf = secret_key + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N;
  const uint8_t *pk_seed = secret_key + 2 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N;
  const uint8_t *pk_root = secret_key + 3 * BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N;

  // Derive randomizer R and copy it to signature
  uint8_t R[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
  slhdsa_thash_prfmsg(R, sk_prf, entropy, header, context, context_len, msg,
                      msg_len);
  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_signature, R, BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N);

  // Compute message digest
  uint8_t digest[SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_DIGEST_SIZE];
  slhdsa_thash_hmsg(digest, R, pk_seed, pk_root, header, context, context_len,
                    msg, msg_len);

  uint8_t fors_digest[SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
  OPENSSL_memcpy(fors_digest, digest, SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES);

  const uint64_t idx_tree =
      load_tree_index(digest + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
  uint32_t idx_leaf = CRYPTO_load_u16_be(
      digest + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_TREE_BYTES);
  idx_leaf &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_LEAF_BITS);

  uint8_t addr[32] = {0};
  slhdsa_set_tree_addr(addr, idx_tree);
  slhdsa_set_type(addr, SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
  slhdsa_set_keypair_addr(addr, idx_leaf);

  slhdsa_fors_sign(out_signature + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N, fors_digest, sk_seed,
                   pk_seed, addr);

  uint8_t pk_fors[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
  slhdsa_fors_pk_from_sig(pk_fors, out_signature + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N,
                          fors_digest, pk_seed, addr);

  slhdsa_ht_sign(
      out_signature + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_BYTES,
      pk_fors, idx_tree, idx_leaf, sk_seed, pk_seed);
  return bcm_infallible::approved;
}

bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign(
    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
    size_t context_len) {
  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  // Construct header for M' as specified in Algorithm 22
  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
  M_prime_header[0] = 0;  // domain separator for pure signing
  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;

  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
  RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(out_signature, private_key, M_prime_header,
                                     context, context_len, msg, msg_len,
                                     entropy);
  return bcm_status::approved;
}

static int slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(uint8_t *out_context_and_oid,
                                      size_t *out_context_and_oid_len,
                                      size_t max_out_context_and_oid,
                                      const uint8_t *context,
                                      size_t context_len, int hash_nid,
                                      size_t hashed_msg_len) {
  const uint8_t *oid;
  size_t oid_len;
  size_t expected_hash_len;
  switch (hash_nid) {
    case NID_sha256:
      oid = kSHA256OID;
      oid_len = sizeof(kSHA256OID);
      static_assert(sizeof(kSHA256OID) <= MAX_OID_LENGTH, "");
      expected_hash_len = 32;
      break;

    // The SLH-DSA spec only lists SHA-256 and SHA-512. This function also
    // supports SHA-384, which is non-standard.
    case NID_sha384:
      oid = kSHA384OID;
      oid_len = sizeof(kSHA384OID);
      static_assert(sizeof(kSHA384OID) <= MAX_OID_LENGTH, "");
      expected_hash_len = 48;
      break;

    // If adding a hash function with a larger `oid_len`, update the size of
    // `context_and_oid` in the callers.
    default:
      return 0;
  }

  if (hashed_msg_len != expected_hash_len) {
    return 0;
  }

  *out_context_and_oid_len = context_len + oid_len;
  if (*out_context_and_oid_len > max_out_context_and_oid) {
    return 0;
  }

  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_context_and_oid, context, context_len);
  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_context_and_oid + context_len, oid, oid_len);

  return 1;
}


bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_sign(
    uint8_t out_signature[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES],
    const uint8_t private_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PRIVATE_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
  M_prime_header[0] = 1;  // domain separator for prehashed signing
  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;

  uint8_t context_and_oid[MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH + MAX_OID_LENGTH];
  size_t context_and_oid_len;
  if (!slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(context_and_oid, &context_and_oid_len,
                                  sizeof(context_and_oid), context, context_len,
                                  hash_nid, hashed_msg_len)) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  uint8_t entropy[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
  RAND_bytes(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
  BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_sign_internal(out_signature, private_key, M_prime_header,
                                     context_and_oid, context_and_oid_len,
                                     hashed_msg, hashed_msg_len, entropy);
  return bcm_status::approved;
}

// Implements Algorithm 24: slh_verify function (Section 10.3, page 41)
bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify(
    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len, const uint8_t *context,
    size_t context_len) {
  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  // Construct header for M' as specified in Algorithm 24
  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
  M_prime_header[0] = 0;  // domain separator for pure verification
  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;

  return BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
      signature, signature_len, public_key, M_prime_header, context,
      context_len, msg, msg_len);
}

bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_prehash_verify(
    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t *hashed_msg, size_t hashed_msg_len, int hash_nid,
    const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
  if (context_len > MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  uint8_t M_prime_header[2];
  M_prime_header[0] = 1;  // domain separator for prehashed verification
  M_prime_header[1] = (uint8_t)context_len;

  uint8_t context_and_oid[MAX_CONTEXT_LENGTH + MAX_OID_LENGTH];
  size_t context_and_oid_len;
  if (!slhdsa_get_context_and_oid(context_and_oid, &context_and_oid_len,
                                  sizeof(context_and_oid), context, context_len,
                                  hash_nid, hashed_msg_len)) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  return BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
      signature, signature_len, public_key, M_prime_header, context_and_oid,
      context_and_oid_len, hashed_msg, hashed_msg_len);
}

bcm_status BCM_slhdsa_sha2_128s_verify_internal(
    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_len,
    const uint8_t public_key[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES],
    const uint8_t header[BCM_SLHDSA_M_PRIME_HEADER_LEN], const uint8_t *context,
    size_t context_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
  if (signature_len != BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_SIGNATURE_BYTES) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }
  const uint8_t *pk_seed = public_key;
  const uint8_t *pk_root = public_key + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N;

  const uint8_t *r = signature;
  const uint8_t *sig_fors = signature + BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N;
  const uint8_t *sig_ht = sig_fors + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_BYTES;

  uint8_t digest[SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_DIGEST_SIZE];
  slhdsa_thash_hmsg(digest, r, pk_seed, pk_root, header, context, context_len,
                    msg, msg_len);

  uint8_t fors_digest[SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES];
  OPENSSL_memcpy(fors_digest, digest, SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES);

  const uint64_t idx_tree =
      load_tree_index(digest + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES);
  uint32_t idx_leaf = CRYPTO_load_u16_be(
      digest + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_FORS_MSG_BYTES + SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_TREE_BYTES);
  idx_leaf &= (~(uint32_t)0) >> (32 - SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_LEAF_BITS);

  uint8_t addr[32] = {0};
  slhdsa_set_tree_addr(addr, idx_tree);
  slhdsa_set_type(addr, SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_ADDR_TYPE_FORSTREE);
  slhdsa_set_keypair_addr(addr, idx_leaf);

  uint8_t pk_fors[BCM_SLHDSA_SHA2_128S_N];
  slhdsa_fors_pk_from_sig(pk_fors, sig_fors, fors_digest, pk_seed, addr);

  if (!slhdsa_ht_verify(sig_ht, pk_fors, idx_tree, idx_leaf, pk_root,
                        pk_seed)) {
    return bcm_status::failure;
  }

  return bcm_status::approved;
}