| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | |
| #include <ctype.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <time.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "vpm_int.h" | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "../x509v3/internal.h" | |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = | |
| CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA; | |
| /* CRL score values */ | |
| /* No unhandled critical extensions */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 | |
| /* certificate is within CRL scope */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 | |
| /* CRL times valid */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 | |
| /* Issuer name matches certificate */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 | |
| /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) | |
| /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 | |
| /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 | |
| /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 | |
| /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ | |
| #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 | |
| static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); | |
| static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); | |
| static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | |
| static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
| unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); | |
| static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
| X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); | |
| static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, | |
| int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, | |
| STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); | |
| static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, | |
| int *pcrl_score); | |
| static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, | |
| unsigned int *preasons); | |
| static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); | |
| static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); | |
| static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | |
| static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) | |
| { | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */ | |
| static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); | |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) | |
| return 1; | |
| else | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ | |
| static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *certs; | |
| X509 *xtmp = NULL; | |
| size_t i; | |
| /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ | |
| certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); | |
| if (certs == NULL) | |
| return NULL; | |
| /* Look for exact match */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { | |
| xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
| if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) | |
| X509_up_ref(xtmp); | |
| else | |
| xtmp = NULL; | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); | |
| return xtmp; | |
| } | |
| int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL; | |
| int bad_chain = 0; | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; | |
| int depth, i, ok = 0; | |
| int num, j, retry, trust; | |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; | |
| if (ctx->cert == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->chain != NULL) { | |
| /* | |
| * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We | |
| * cannot do another one. | |
| */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
| /* | |
| * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that | |
| * the first entry is in place | |
| */ | |
| ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| X509_up_ref(ctx->cert); | |
| ctx->last_untrusted = 1; | |
| /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it. | |
| * sktmp = ctx->untrusted ++ ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted */ | |
| if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | |
| && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted != NULL) { | |
| if (sktmp == NULL) { | |
| sktmp = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| if (sktmp == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (size_t k = 0; k < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); | |
| k++) { | |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, | |
| sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, | |
| k))) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
| depth = param->depth; | |
| for (;;) { | |
| /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
| if (depth < num) | |
| break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | |
| * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | |
| * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code | |
| * later. */ | |
| /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
| if (cert_self_signed(x)) | |
| break; | |
| /* | |
| * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first | |
| */ | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) { | |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
| if (ok < 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up | |
| * again later. | |
| */ | |
| if (ok > 0) { | |
| X509_free(xtmp); | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | |
| if (sktmp != NULL) { | |
| xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); | |
| if (xtmp != NULL) { | |
| if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| ok = 0; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| X509_up_ref(xtmp); | |
| (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); | |
| ctx->last_untrusted++; | |
| x = xtmp; | |
| num++; | |
| /* | |
| * reparse the full chain for the next one | |
| */ | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */ | |
| j = num; | |
| /* | |
| * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates. | |
| * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we | |
| * complain. | |
| */ | |
| do { | |
| /* | |
| * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed. | |
| */ | |
| i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1); | |
| if (cert_self_signed(x)) { | |
| /* we have a self signed certificate */ | |
| if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) { | |
| /* | |
| * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can | |
| * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid | |
| * possible impersonation. | |
| */ | |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
| if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i - 1; | |
| if (ok == 1) | |
| X509_free(xtmp); | |
| bad_chain = 1; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } else { | |
| /* | |
| * We have a match: replace certificate with store | |
| * version so we get any trust settings. | |
| */ | |
| X509_free(x); | |
| x = xtmp; | |
| (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | |
| ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* | |
| * extract and save self signed certificate for later use | |
| */ | |
| chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
| ctx->last_untrusted--; | |
| num--; | |
| j--; | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | |
| for (;;) { | |
| /* If we have enough, we break */ | |
| if (depth < num) | |
| break; | |
| /* If we are self signed, we break */ | |
| if (cert_self_signed(x)) | |
| break; | |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | |
| if (ok < 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (ok == 0) | |
| break; | |
| x = xtmp; | |
| if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) { | |
| X509_free(xtmp); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| ok = 0; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| num++; | |
| } | |
| /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | |
| trust = check_trust(ctx); | |
| /* If explicitly rejected error */ | |
| if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
| ok = 0; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative | |
| * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already | |
| * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate | |
| * chain checking | |
| */ | |
| retry = 0; | |
| if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED | |
| && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) | |
| && !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) { | |
| while (j-- > 1) { | |
| xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1); | |
| ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2); | |
| if (ok < 0) | |
| goto end; | |
| /* Check if we found an alternate chain */ | |
| if (ok > 0) { | |
| /* | |
| * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later | |
| */ | |
| X509_free(xtmp); | |
| /* | |
| * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an | |
| * alternate chain | |
| */ | |
| while (num > j) { | |
| xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | |
| X509_free(xtmp); | |
| num--; | |
| } | |
| ctx->last_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
| retry = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } while (retry); | |
| /* | |
| * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single | |
| * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already | |
| * and set bad_chain == 1 | |
| */ | |
| if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) { | |
| if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) { | |
| if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | |
| else | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| } else { | |
| sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss); | |
| num++; | |
| ctx->last_untrusted = num; | |
| ctx->current_cert = chain_ss; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | |
| chain_ss = NULL; | |
| } | |
| ctx->error_depth = num - 1; | |
| bad_chain = 1; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | |
| ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| ok = check_id(ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| /* | |
| * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because | |
| * they may be needed for CRL signature verification. | |
| */ | |
| ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, | |
| ctx->param->flags); | |
| if (err != X509_V_OK) { | |
| ctx->error = err; | |
| ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth); | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ | |
| if (ctx->verify != NULL) | |
| ok = ctx->verify(ctx); | |
| else | |
| ok = internal_verify(ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| /* Check name constraints */ | |
| ok = check_name_constraints(ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ | |
| if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) | |
| ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); | |
| end: | |
| if (sktmp != NULL) | |
| sk_X509_free(sktmp); | |
| if (chain_ss != NULL) | |
| X509_free(chain_ss); | |
| /* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */ | |
| if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | |
| */ | |
| static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| X509 *issuer; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
| if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | |
| return issuer; | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | |
| static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | |
| if (ret == X509_V_OK) | |
| return 1; | |
| /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->error = ret; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
| return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| } | |
| /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | |
| static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | |
| if (*issuer) { | |
| X509_up_ref(*issuer); | |
| return 1; | |
| } else | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied | |
| * purpose | |
| */ | |
| static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| int i, ok = 0, plen = 0; | |
| X509 *x; | |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
| int proxy_path_length = 0; | |
| int purpose; | |
| int allow_proxy_certs; | |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
| enum { | |
| // ca_or_leaf allows either type of certificate so that direct use of | |
| // self-signed certificates works. | |
| ca_or_leaf, | |
| must_be_ca, | |
| must_not_be_ca, | |
| } ca_requirement; | |
| /* CRL path validation */ | |
| if (ctx->parent) { | |
| allow_proxy_certs = 0; | |
| purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; | |
| } else { | |
| allow_proxy_certs = | |
| ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); | |
| purpose = ctx->param->purpose; | |
| } | |
| ca_requirement = ca_or_leaf; | |
| /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { | |
| int ret; | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
| && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| switch (ca_requirement) { | |
| case ca_or_leaf: | |
| ret = 1; | |
| break; | |
| case must_not_be_ca: | |
| if (X509_check_ca(x)) { | |
| ret = 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; | |
| } else | |
| ret = 1; | |
| break; | |
| case must_be_ca: | |
| if (!X509_check_ca(x)) { | |
| ret = 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | |
| } else | |
| ret = 1; | |
| break; | |
| default: | |
| // impossible. | |
| ret = 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ret == 0) { | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) { | |
| ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, ca_requirement == must_be_ca); | |
| if (ret != 1) { | |
| ret = 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ | |
| if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) | |
| && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | |
| && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| /* Increment path length if not self issued */ | |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
| plen++; | |
| /* | |
| * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate | |
| * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, | |
| * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. | |
| */ | |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | |
| if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| proxy_path_length++; | |
| ca_requirement = must_not_be_ca; | |
| } else { | |
| ca_requirement = must_be_ca; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ok = 1; | |
| end: | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509) | |
| { | |
| X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509); | |
| int i = -1; | |
| for (;;) { | |
| i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i); | |
| if (i == -1) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); | |
| ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry); | |
| unsigned char *idval; | |
| int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name); | |
| if (idlen < 0) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| } | |
| /* Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is | |
| * important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|. */ | |
| int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen); | |
| OPENSSL_free(idval); | |
| if (looks_like_dns) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| int i, j, rv; | |
| int has_name_constraints = 0; | |
| /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ | |
| for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
| X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
| /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ | |
| if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) | |
| continue; | |
| /* | |
| * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain | |
| * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed | |
| * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them | |
| * to be obeyed. | |
| */ | |
| for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { | |
| NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; | |
| if (nc) { | |
| has_name_constraints = 1; | |
| rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); | |
| switch (rv) { | |
| case X509_V_OK: | |
| continue; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
| ctx->error = rv; | |
| return 0; | |
| default: | |
| ctx->error = rv; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Name constraints do not match against the common name, but | |
| * |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on | |
| * certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are | |
| * checked instead. | |
| * | |
| * While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name | |
| * constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher | |
| * standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any | |
| * worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail | |
| * the name constraint anyway. */ | |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); | |
| if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) { | |
| rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf); | |
| switch (rv) { | |
| case X509_V_OK: | |
| break; | |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: | |
| ctx->error = rv; | |
| return 0; | |
| default: | |
| ctx->error = rv; | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = leaf; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) | |
| { | |
| ctx->error = errcode; | |
| ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert; | |
| ctx->error_depth = 0; | |
| return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| } | |
| static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts); | |
| char *name; | |
| if (id->peername != NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(id->peername); | |
| id->peername = NULL; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { | |
| name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i); | |
| if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), id->hostflags, | |
| &id->peername) > 0) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return n == 0; | |
| } | |
| static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id; | |
| X509 *x = ctx->cert; | |
| if (id->poison) { | |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) { | |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { | |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) { | |
| if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| int ok; | |
| X509 *x = NULL; | |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
| /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */ | |
| for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
| ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); | |
| /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ | |
| if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
| /* | |
| * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not | |
| * overridden. | |
| */ | |
| if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate | |
| * return success. | |
| */ | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
| X509 *mx; | |
| if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) | |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0); | |
| mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); | |
| if (mx) { | |
| (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); | |
| X509_free(x); | |
| ctx->last_untrusted = 0; | |
| return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow | |
| * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. | |
| */ | |
| return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; | |
| } | |
| static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| int i, last, ok; | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) | |
| last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
| else { | |
| /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ | |
| if (ctx->parent) | |
| return 1; | |
| last = 0; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { | |
| ctx->error_depth = i; | |
| ok = check_cert(ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
| X509 *x; | |
| int ok = 0, cnum; | |
| unsigned int last_reasons; | |
| cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ctx->current_issuer = NULL; | |
| ctx->current_crl_score = 0; | |
| ctx->current_reasons = 0; | |
| while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { | |
| last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
| /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ | |
| if (ctx->get_crl) | |
| ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); | |
| else | |
| ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); | |
| /* | |
| * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback | |
| */ | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
| ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (dcrl) { | |
| ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } else | |
| ok = 1; | |
| /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ | |
| if (ok != 2) { | |
| ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
| X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
| crl = NULL; | |
| dcrl = NULL; | |
| /* | |
| * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration, | |
| * so exit loop. | |
| */ | |
| if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
| X509_CRL_free(dcrl); | |
| ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ | |
| static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) | |
| { | |
| time_t *ptime; | |
| int i; | |
| if (notify) | |
| ctx->current_crl = crl; | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
| ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
| else | |
| ptime = NULL; | |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| if (!notify) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (i > 0) { | |
| if (!notify) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) { | |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| if (!notify) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ | |
| if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { | |
| if (!notify) | |
| return 0; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (notify) | |
| ctx->current_crl = NULL; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, | |
| X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, | |
| STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
| { | |
| int crl_score, best_score = *pscore; | |
| size_t i; | |
| unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; | |
| X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; | |
| X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; | |
| X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
| crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
| reasons = *preasons; | |
| crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); | |
| if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) | |
| continue; | |
| /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ | |
| if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { | |
| int day, sec; | |
| if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(best_crl), | |
| X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) | |
| continue; | |
| /* | |
| * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| | |
| * and |sec|. | |
| */ | |
| if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| best_crl = crl; | |
| best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; | |
| best_score = crl_score; | |
| best_reasons = reasons; | |
| } | |
| if (best_crl) { | |
| if (*pcrl) | |
| X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); | |
| *pcrl = best_crl; | |
| *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; | |
| *pscore = best_score; | |
| *preasons = best_reasons; | |
| X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); | |
| if (*pdcrl) { | |
| X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); | |
| *pdcrl = NULL; | |
| } | |
| get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); | |
| } | |
| if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) | |
| return 1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be | |
| * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. | |
| */ | |
| static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) | |
| { | |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; | |
| int i; | |
| i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); | |
| if (i >= 0) { | |
| /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ | |
| if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) | |
| return 0; | |
| exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); | |
| } else | |
| exta = NULL; | |
| i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); | |
| if (i >= 0) { | |
| if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) | |
| return 0; | |
| extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); | |
| } else | |
| extb = NULL; | |
| if (!exta && !extb) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (!exta || !extb) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) | |
| return 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ | |
| static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) | |
| { | |
| /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ | |
| if (!delta->base_crl_number) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Base must have a CRL number */ | |
| if (!base->crl_number) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Issuer names must match */ | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
| if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ | |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) | |
| return 1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or | |
| * retrieve a chain of deltas... | |
| */ | |
| static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, | |
| X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) | |
| { | |
| X509_CRL *delta; | |
| size_t i; | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) | |
| return; | |
| if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) | |
| return; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { | |
| delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); | |
| if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { | |
| if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) | |
| *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; | |
| X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); | |
| *dcrl = delta; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| *dcrl = NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate | |
| * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not | |
| * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is | |
| * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL | |
| * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. | |
| */ | |
| static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, | |
| unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| int crl_score = 0; | |
| unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; | |
| /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ | |
| /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ | |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { | |
| if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { | |
| /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
| if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ | |
| else if (crl->base_crl_number) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { | |
| if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else | |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; | |
| if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) | |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; | |
| /* Check expiry */ | |
| if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) | |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; | |
| /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ | |
| crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); | |
| /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ | |
| if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ | |
| if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { | |
| /* If no new reasons reject */ | |
| if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) | |
| return 0; | |
| tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; | |
| crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; | |
| } | |
| *preasons = tmp_reasons; | |
| return crl_score; | |
| } | |
| static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, | |
| X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) | |
| { | |
| X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; | |
| X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
| int cidx = ctx->error_depth; | |
| size_t i; | |
| if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) | |
| cidx++; | |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
| if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { | |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; | |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { | |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
| continue; | |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; | |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) | |
| return; | |
| /* | |
| * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of | |
| * untrusted certificates. | |
| */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { | |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
| continue; | |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted); i++) { | |
| crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->ctx->additional_untrusted, i); | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) | |
| continue; | |
| if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { | |
| *pissuer = crl_issuer; | |
| *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new | |
| * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the | |
| * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will | |
| * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. | |
| */ | |
| static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; | |
| int ret; | |
| /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ | |
| if (ctx->parent) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) | |
| return -1; | |
| crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; | |
| /* Copy verify params across */ | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); | |
| crl_ctx.parent = ctx; | |
| crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
| /* Verify CRL issuer */ | |
| ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); | |
| if (ret <= 0) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* Check chain is acceptable */ | |
| ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); | |
| err: | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and | |
| * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could | |
| * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more | |
| * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, | |
| * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the | |
| * RFC5280 version | |
| */ | |
| static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) | |
| { | |
| X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; | |
| cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); | |
| crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); | |
| if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) | |
| return 1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1. | |
| * Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one | |
| * relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and | |
| * compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match. | |
| */ | |
| static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) | |
| { | |
| X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
| GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; | |
| GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; | |
| size_t i, j; | |
| if (!a || !b) | |
| return 1; | |
| if (a->type == 1) { | |
| if (!a->dpname) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ | |
| if (b->type == 1) { | |
| if (!b->dpname) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) | |
| return 1; | |
| else | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
| nm = a->dpname; | |
| gens = b->name.fullname; | |
| } else if (b->type == 1) { | |
| if (!b->dpname) | |
| return 0; | |
| /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ | |
| gens = a->name.fullname; | |
| nm = b->dpname; | |
| } | |
| /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ | |
| if (nm) { | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
| gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
| if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
| continue; | |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { | |
| gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); | |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { | |
| genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); | |
| if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); | |
| /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ | |
| if (!dp->CRLissuer) | |
| return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
| if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) | |
| continue; | |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ | |
| static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, | |
| unsigned int *preasons) | |
| { | |
| size_t i; | |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { | |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) | |
| return 0; | |
| } else { | |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
| DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); | |
| if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { | |
| if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { | |
| *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) | |
| && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
| return 1; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try | |
| * to find a delta CRL too | |
| */ | |
| static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
| X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| int ok; | |
| X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
| int crl_score = 0; | |
| unsigned int reasons; | |
| X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; | |
| X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
| reasons = ctx->current_reasons; | |
| ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, | |
| &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); | |
| if (ok) | |
| goto done; | |
| /* Lookup CRLs from store */ | |
| skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); | |
| /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ | |
| if (!skcrl && crl) | |
| goto done; | |
| get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); | |
| sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); | |
| done: | |
| /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ | |
| if (crl) { | |
| ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | |
| ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; | |
| ctx->current_reasons = reasons; | |
| *pcrl = crl; | |
| *pdcrl = dcrl; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Check CRL validity */ | |
| static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) | |
| { | |
| X509 *issuer = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; | |
| int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; | |
| cnum = ctx->error_depth; | |
| chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | |
| /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ | |
| if (ctx->current_issuer) | |
| issuer = ctx->current_issuer; | |
| /* | |
| * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next | |
| * certificate in chain. | |
| */ | |
| else if (cnum < chnum) | |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); | |
| else { | |
| issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); | |
| /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ | |
| if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (issuer) { | |
| /* | |
| * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done | |
| */ | |
| if (!crl->base_crl_number) { | |
| /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ | |
| if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
| !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) { | |
| if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) { | |
| ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ | |
| ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); | |
| if (!ikey) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } else { | |
| int rv; | |
| rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); | |
| if (rv != X509_V_OK) { | |
| ctx->error = rv; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Verify CRL signature */ | |
| if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ok = 1; | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| /* Check certificate against CRL */ | |
| static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| int ok; | |
| X509_REVOKED *rev; | |
| /* | |
| * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled | |
| * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate | |
| * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can | |
| * change the meaning of CRL entries. | |
| */ | |
| if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) | |
| && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason | |
| * is not removeFromCRL. | |
| */ | |
| if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { | |
| if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) | |
| return 2; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; | |
| ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| if (ctx->parent) | |
| return 1; | |
| ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, | |
| ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); | |
| if (ret == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ | |
| if (ret == -1) { | |
| /* | |
| * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. | |
| */ | |
| X509 *x; | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { | |
| x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) | |
| continue; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ret == -2) { | |
| ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; | |
| return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { | |
| ctx->current_cert = NULL; | |
| /* | |
| * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed | |
| * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then | |
| * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier | |
| * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. | |
| */ | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| time_t *ptime; | |
| int i; | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | |
| ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; | |
| else | |
| ptime = NULL; | |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (i > 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | |
| ctx->current_cert = x; | |
| if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| int ok = 0, n; | |
| X509 *xs, *xi; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); | |
| cb = ctx->verify_cb; | |
| n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | |
| ctx->error_depth = n - 1; | |
| n--; | |
| xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
| if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | |
| xs = xi; | |
| else { | |
| if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { | |
| xs = xi; | |
| goto check_cert; | |
| } | |
| if (n <= 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | |
| ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
| ok = cb(0, ctx); | |
| goto end; | |
| } else { | |
| n--; | |
| ctx->error_depth = n; | |
| xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | |
| while (n >= 0) { | |
| ctx->error_depth = n; | |
| /* | |
| * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless | |
| * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes | |
| * time. | |
| */ | |
| if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | |
| ctx->current_cert = xi; | |
| ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { | |
| ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | |
| ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
| ok = (*cb) (0, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| pkey = NULL; | |
| } | |
| check_cert: | |
| ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | |
| ctx->current_issuer = xi; | |
| ctx->current_cert = xs; | |
| ok = (*cb) (1, ctx); | |
| if (!ok) | |
| goto end; | |
| n--; | |
| if (n >= 0) { | |
| xi = xs; | |
| xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ok = 1; | |
| end: | |
| return ok; | |
| } | |
| int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) | |
| { | |
| return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | |
| } | |
| int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) | |
| { | |
| static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; | |
| static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; | |
| ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; | |
| int i, day, sec, ret = 0; | |
| /* | |
| * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. | |
| * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: | |
| * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
| * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ | |
| * | |
| * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: | |
| * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate | |
| * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity | |
| * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." | |
| */ | |
| switch (ctm->type) { | |
| case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: | |
| if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) | |
| return 0; | |
| break; | |
| case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: | |
| if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) | |
| return 0; | |
| break; | |
| default: | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more | |
| * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. | |
| * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. | |
| */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { | |
| if (!isdigit(ctm->data[i])) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z') | |
| return 0; | |
| /* | |
| * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no | |
| * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, | |
| * so we go through ASN.1 | |
| */ | |
| asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); | |
| if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* | |
| * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. | |
| * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. | |
| */ | |
| ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; | |
| err: | |
| ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) | |
| { | |
| return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | |
| } | |
| ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) | |
| { | |
| return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); | |
| } | |
| ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, | |
| int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) | |
| { | |
| time_t t = 0; | |
| if (in_tm) | |
| t = *in_tm; | |
| else | |
| time(&t); | |
| if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { | |
| if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | |
| return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
| if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) | |
| return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
| } | |
| return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); | |
| } | |
| /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ | |
| X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, | |
| EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) | |
| { | |
| X509_CRL *crl = NULL; | |
| int i; | |
| size_t j; | |
| STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; | |
| /* CRLs can't be delta already */ | |
| if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ | |
| if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Issuer names must match */ | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* AKID and IDP must match */ | |
| if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ | |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* CRLs must verify */ | |
| if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || | |
| X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* Create new CRL */ | |
| crl = X509_CRL_new(); | |
| if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| /* Set issuer name */ | |
| if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer))) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer))) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ | |
| if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| /* | |
| * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL | |
| * number to correct value too. | |
| */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { | |
| X509_EXTENSION *ext; | |
| ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); | |
| if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| } | |
| /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ | |
| revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); | |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); j++) { | |
| X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; | |
| rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, j); | |
| /* | |
| * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here | |
| * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. | |
| */ | |
| if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) { | |
| rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); | |
| if (!rvtmp) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { | |
| X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); | |
| goto memerr; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ | |
| if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) | |
| goto memerr; | |
| return crl; | |
| memerr: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| if (crl) | |
| X509_CRL_free(crl); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_unused * unused, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | |
| { | |
| /* | |
| * This function is (usually) called only once, by | |
| * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). | |
| */ | |
| int index; | |
| if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, | |
| free_func)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return index; | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) | |
| { | |
| return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); | |
| } | |
| void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) | |
| { | |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->error; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | |
| { | |
| ctx->error = err; | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->error_depth; | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->current_cert; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->chain; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (!ctx->chain) | |
| return NULL; | |
| return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->current_issuer; | |
| } | |
| X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->current_crl; | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->parent; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | |
| { | |
| ctx->cert = x; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
| { | |
| ctx->untrusted = sk; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->untrusted; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) | |
| { | |
| ctx->crls = sk; | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) | |
| { | |
| return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) | |
| { | |
| return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. | |
| * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and | |
| * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't | |
| * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then | |
| * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL | |
| * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the | |
| * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL | |
| * client/server. | |
| */ | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | |
| int purpose, int trust) | |
| { | |
| int idx; | |
| /* If purpose not set use default */ | |
| if (!purpose) | |
| purpose = def_purpose; | |
| /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | |
| if (purpose) { | |
| X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | |
| if (idx == -1) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
| if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | |
| idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | |
| if (idx == -1) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | |
| } | |
| /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | |
| if (!trust) | |
| trust = ptmp->trust; | |
| } | |
| if (trust) { | |
| idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | |
| if (idx == -1) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) | |
| ctx->param->purpose = purpose; | |
| if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) | |
| ctx->param->trust = trust; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) | |
| { | |
| X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | |
| ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
| if (!ctx) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx); | |
| return ctx; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_zero(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (ctx == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ctx); | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
| { | |
| int ret = 1; | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_zero(ctx); | |
| ctx->ctx = store; | |
| ctx->cert = x509; | |
| ctx->untrusted = chain; | |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data); | |
| ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); | |
| if (!ctx->param) | |
| goto err; | |
| /* | |
| * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. | |
| */ | |
| if (store) | |
| ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); | |
| else | |
| ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; | |
| if (store) { | |
| ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
| ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; | |
| } else | |
| ctx->cleanup = 0; | |
| if (ret) | |
| ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); | |
| if (ret == 0) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (store && store->check_issued) | |
| ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; | |
| else | |
| ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | |
| if (store && store->get_issuer) | |
| ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; | |
| else | |
| ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | |
| if (store && store->verify_cb) | |
| ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | |
| else | |
| ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; | |
| if (store && store->verify) | |
| ctx->verify = store->verify; | |
| else | |
| ctx->verify = internal_verify; | |
| if (store && store->check_revocation) | |
| ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; | |
| else | |
| ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; | |
| if (store && store->get_crl) | |
| ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; | |
| else | |
| ctx->get_crl = NULL; | |
| if (store && store->check_crl) | |
| ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; | |
| else | |
| ctx->check_crl = check_crl; | |
| if (store && store->cert_crl) | |
| ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; | |
| else | |
| ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; | |
| if (store && store->lookup_certs) | |
| ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; | |
| else | |
| ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs; | |
| if (store && store->lookup_crls) | |
| ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; | |
| else | |
| ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls; | |
| ctx->check_policy = check_policy; | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data); | |
| if (ctx->param != NULL) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* | |
| * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This | |
| * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | |
| */ | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | |
| { | |
| ctx->other_ctx = sk; | |
| ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| /* We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, |X509_STORE_CTX_free| | |
| * also calls this function. */ | |
| if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { | |
| ctx->cleanup(ctx); | |
| ctx->cleanup = NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->param != NULL) { | |
| if (ctx->parent == NULL) | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
| ctx->param = NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->tree != NULL) { | |
| X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); | |
| ctx->tree = NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (ctx->chain != NULL) { | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); | |
| ctx->chain = NULL; | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); | |
| OPENSSL_memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) | |
| { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) | |
| { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, | |
| time_t t) | |
| { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->cert; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, | |
| int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) | |
| { | |
| ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; | |
| } | |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->tree; | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->explicit_policy; | |
| } | |
| int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) | |
| { | |
| const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; | |
| param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); | |
| if (!param) | |
| return 0; | |
| return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); | |
| } | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
| { | |
| return ctx->param; | |
| } | |
| void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) | |
| { | |
| if (ctx->param) | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); | |
| ctx->param = param; | |
| } | |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) |