Partially split out crypto/pkcs8's legacy ASN.1 dependencies.
PKCS8_encrypt and PKCS8_decrypt still need to be split. The code for
processing PKCS#12 files is, for now, placed entirely in pkcs8_x509.c.
If we need to split it up, it should be straightforward to do so.
(Introduce a CRYPTO_BUFFER version of PKCS12_get_key_and_certs and go
from there.)
BUG=54
Change-Id: I9c87e916ec29ee14dbbd81c4d3fc10ac8a461f1a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14214
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/CMakeLists.txt b/crypto/pkcs8/CMakeLists.txt
index a2e52e1..0bdccec 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs8/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/crypto/pkcs8/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
OBJECT
pkcs8.c
- p8_pkey.c
+ pkcs8_x509.c
p5_pbev2.c
)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/internal.h b/crypto/pkcs8/internal.h
index 56dc628..583997d 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs8/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/pkcs8/internal.h
@@ -63,6 +63,26 @@
#endif
+/* pkcs8_pbe_decrypt decrypts |in| using the PBE scheme described by
+ * |algorithm|, which should be a serialized AlgorithmIdentifier structure. On
+ * success, it sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer containing the decrypted
+ * result and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero. */
+int pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, CBS *algorithm,
+ const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len);
+
+#define PKCS12_KEY_ID 1
+#define PKCS12_IV_ID 2
+#define PKCS12_MAC_ID 3
+
+/* pkcs12_key_gen runs the PKCS#12 key derivation function as specified in
+ * RFC 7292, appendix B. On success, it writes the resulting |out_len| bytes of
+ * key material to |out| and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero. |id|
+ * should be one of the |PKCS12_*_ID| values. */
+int pkcs12_key_gen(const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
+ size_t salt_len, uint8_t id, unsigned iterations,
+ size_t out_len, uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *md);
+
struct pbe_suite {
int pbe_nid;
uint8_t oid[10];
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/p8_pkey.c b/crypto/pkcs8/p8_pkey.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 69a7e29..0000000
--- a/crypto/pkcs8/p8_pkey.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 1999.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-/* Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data */
-static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
- void *exarg) {
- /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
- if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
- if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING &&
- key->pkey->value.octet_string) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
- key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_ANY),
- ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
-
-IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c
index f9b5ab5..a701c98 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
@@ -67,20 +66,14 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "../internal.h"
-#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
-#include "../digest/internal.h"
-#define PKCS12_KEY_ID 1
-#define PKCS12_IV_ID 2
-#define PKCS12_MAC_ID 3
-
static int ascii_to_ucs2(const char *ascii, size_t ascii_len,
uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) {
size_t ulen = ascii_len * 2 + 2;
@@ -106,10 +99,9 @@
return 1;
}
-static int pkcs12_key_gen(const char *pass, size_t pass_len,
- const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, uint8_t id,
- unsigned iterations, size_t out_len, uint8_t *out,
- const EVP_MD *md) {
+int pkcs12_key_gen(const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *salt,
+ size_t salt_len, uint8_t id, unsigned iterations,
+ size_t out_len, uint8_t *out, const EVP_MD *md) {
/* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#appendix-B. Quoted parts of the
* specification have errata applied and other typos fixed. */
@@ -361,9 +353,9 @@
salt_len, 1 /* encrypt */);
}
-static int pbe_decrypt(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, CBS *algorithm,
- const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *in,
- size_t in_len) {
+int pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, CBS *algorithm,
+ const char *pass, size_t pass_len, const uint8_t *in,
+ size_t in_len) {
int ret = 0;
uint8_t *buf = NULL;;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
@@ -451,8 +443,8 @@
goto err;
}
- if (!pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &algorithm, pass, pass_len,
- CBS_data(&ciphertext), CBS_len(&ciphertext))) {
+ if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &algorithm, pass, pass_len,
+ CBS_data(&ciphertext), CBS_len(&ciphertext))) {
goto err;
}
@@ -578,631 +570,3 @@
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return ret;
}
-
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
- uint8_t *der = NULL;
- int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der);
- if (der_len < 0) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- CBS cbs;
- CBS_init(&cbs, der, (size_t)der_len);
- EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs);
- if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return ret;
-}
-
-PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
- CBB cbb;
- uint8_t *der = NULL;
- size_t der_len;
- if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
- !EVP_marshal_private_key(&cbb, pkey) ||
- !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len) ||
- der_len > LONG_MAX) {
- CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- const uint8_t *p = der;
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
- if (p8 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return p8;
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(der);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-struct pkcs12_context {
- EVP_PKEY **out_key;
- STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
- const char *password;
- size_t password_len;
-};
-
-/* PKCS12_handle_sequence parses a BER-encoded SEQUENCE of elements in a PKCS#12
- * structure. */
-static int PKCS12_handle_sequence(
- CBS *sequence, struct pkcs12_context *ctx,
- int (*handle_element)(CBS *cbs, struct pkcs12_context *ctx)) {
- uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
- size_t der_len;
- CBS in;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
- * the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
- * conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
- * through one we need to convert to DER again. */
- if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(sequence, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (der_bytes != NULL) {
- CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
- } else {
- CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(sequence), CBS_len(sequence));
- }
-
- CBS child;
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
- CBS_len(&in) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
- CBS element;
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &element, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!handle_element(&element, ctx)) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/* 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2 */
-static const uint8_t kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag[] = {
- 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02};
-
-/* 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3 */
-static const uint8_t kCertBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
- 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x03};
-
-/* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1 */
-static const uint8_t kX509Certificate[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
- 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01};
-
-/* PKCS12_handle_safe_bag parses a single SafeBag element in a PKCS#12
- * structure. */
-static int PKCS12_handle_safe_bag(CBS *safe_bag, struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
- CBS bag_id, wrapped_value;
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_id, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &wrapped_value,
- CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)
- /* Ignore the bagAttributes field. */) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag,
- sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag))) {
- /* See RFC 7292, section 4.2.2. */
- if (*ctx->out_key) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&wrapped_value) > LONG_MAX) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* |encrypted| isn't actually an X.509 signature, but it has the same
- * structure as one and so |X509_SIG| is reused to store it. */
- const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&wrapped_value);
- X509_SIG *encrypted =
- d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&wrapped_value));
- if (encrypted == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
- if (inp != CBS_data(&wrapped_value) + CBS_len(&wrapped_value)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
- return 0;
- }
-
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *pki =
- PKCS8_decrypt(encrypted, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
- X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
- if (pki == NULL) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- *ctx->out_key = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pki);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(pki);
- return ctx->out_key != NULL;
- }
-
- if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag))) {
- /* See RFC 7292, section 4.2.3. */
- CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_value, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
- CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Skip unknown certificate types. */
- if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cert_type, kX509Certificate,
- sizeof(kX509Certificate))) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
- X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert));
- if (!x509) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- X509_free(x509);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
- X509_free(x509);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */
-static const uint8_t kPKCS7Data[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
- 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01};
-
-/* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6 */
-static const uint8_t kPKCS7EncryptedData[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
- 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06};
-
-/* PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
- * PKCS#12 structure. */
-static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info,
- struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
- CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents;
- int ret = 0;
- uint8_t *storage = NULL;
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
- CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
- CBS_len(content_info) != 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7EncryptedData,
- sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData))) {
- /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
- *
- * PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
- * encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
- * RC2-CBC. */
- CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
- uint8_t *out;
- size_t out_len;
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
- /* EncryptedContentInfo, see
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1 */
- !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
- /* AlgorithmIdentifier, see
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 */
- !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(
- &eci, &encrypted_contents, &storage,
- CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_mem_equal(&contents_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &ai, ctx->password, ctx->password_len,
- CBS_data(&encrypted_contents),
- CBS_len(&encrypted_contents))) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- CBS safe_contents;
- CBS_init(&safe_contents, out, out_len);
- ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&safe_contents, ctx, PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
- OPENSSL_free(out);
- } else if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
- CBS octet_string_contents;
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
- CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&octet_string_contents, ctx,
- PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
- } else {
- /* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
- ret = 1;
- }
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(storage);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
- CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
- uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
- size_t der_len;
- CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
- uint64_t version;
- int ret = 0;
- struct pkcs12_context ctx;
- const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
-
- /* The input may be in BER format. */
- if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- return 0;
- }
- if (der_bytes != NULL) {
- CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
- } else {
- CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(ber_in), CBS_len(ber_in));
- }
-
- *out_key = NULL;
- OPENSSL_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
-
- /* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
- * four. */
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
- CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
- !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (version < 3) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7. */
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
- CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The content type can either be data or signedData. The latter indicates
- * that it's signed by a public key, which isn't supported. */
- if (!CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ctx.out_key = out_key;
- ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
- ctx.password = password;
- ctx.password_len = password != NULL ? strlen(password) : 0;
-
- /* Verify the MAC. */
- {
- CBS mac, salt, expected_mac;
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- const EVP_MD *md = EVP_parse_digest_algorithm(&mac);
- if (md == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
- !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* The iteration count is optional and the default is one. */
- uint64_t iterations = 1;
- if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
- if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
- iterations > UINT_MAX) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- if (!pkcs12_key_gen(ctx.password, ctx.password_len, CBS_data(&salt),
- CBS_len(&salt), PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations,
- EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, md)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned hmac_len;
- if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(&authsafes),
- CBS_len(&authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_mem_equal(&expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos. */
- if (!PKCS12_handle_sequence(&authsafes, &ctx, PKCS12_handle_content_info)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
- if (!ret) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
- *out_key = NULL;
- while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
- X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
- X509_free(x509);
- }
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) {}
-
-struct pkcs12_st {
- uint8_t *ber_bytes;
- size_t ber_len;
-};
-
-PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes,
- size_t ber_len) {
- PKCS12 *p12;
-
- p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
- if (!p12) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
- if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
- OPENSSL_free(p12);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
- p12->ber_len = ber_len;
- *ber_bytes += ber_len;
-
- if (out_p12) {
- PKCS12_free(*out_p12);
-
- *out_p12 = p12;
- }
-
- return p12;
-}
-
-PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
- size_t used = 0;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- const uint8_t *dummy;
- static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
- PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
-
- buf = BUF_MEM_new();
- if (buf == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
- if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
- if (n < 0) {
- if (used == 0) {
- goto out;
- }
- /* Workaround a bug in node.js. It uses a memory BIO for this in the wrong
- * mode. */
- n = 0;
- }
-
- if (n == 0) {
- break;
- }
- used += n;
-
- if (used < buf->length) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
- BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
- ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
-
-out:
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- return ret;
-}
-
-PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
- BIO *bio;
- PKCS12 *ret;
-
- bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
- if (!bio) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
- BIO_free(bio);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
- X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
- CBS ber_bytes;
- STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
- char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
-
- if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
- ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
- }
-
- if (!ca_certs) {
- ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
- if (ca_certs == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- ca_certs_alloced = 1;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
- if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
- if (ca_certs_alloced) {
- sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- *out_cert = NULL;
- if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) > 0) {
- *out_cert = sk_X509_shift(ca_certs);
- }
-
- if (out_ca_certs) {
- *out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
- } else {
- sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password,
- int password_len) {
- if (password == NULL) {
- if (password_len != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (password_len != -1 &&
- (password[password_len] != 0 ||
- OPENSSL_memchr(password, 0, password_len) != NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- X509 *cert = NULL;
- if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL)) {
- ERR_clear_error();
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- X509_free(cert);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
- if (p12 == NULL) {
- return;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
- OPENSSL_free(p12);
-}
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fdc053
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8_x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,728 @@
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 1999.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
+#include "../digest/internal.h"
+#include "../internal.h"
+
+
+/* Minor tweak to operation: zero private key data */
+static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg) {
+ /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
+ if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
+ if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING &&
+ key->pkey->value.octet_string) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
+ key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey_cb) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkeyalg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, pkey, ASN1_ANY),
+ ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) {
+ uint8_t *der = NULL;
+ int der_len = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(p8, &der);
+ if (der_len < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, der, (size_t)der_len);
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_parse_private_key(&cbs);
+ if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+ CBB cbb;
+ uint8_t *der = NULL;
+ size_t der_len;
+ if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||
+ !EVP_marshal_private_key(&cbb, pkey) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&cbb, &der, &der_len) ||
+ der_len > LONG_MAX) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ const uint8_t *p = der;
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
+ if (p8 == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return p8;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct pkcs12_context {
+ EVP_PKEY **out_key;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
+ const char *password;
+ size_t password_len;
+};
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_sequence parses a BER-encoded SEQUENCE of elements in a PKCS#12
+ * structure. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_sequence(
+ CBS *sequence, struct pkcs12_context *ctx,
+ int (*handle_element)(CBS *cbs, struct pkcs12_context *ctx)) {
+ uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+ size_t der_len;
+ CBS in;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
+ * the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
+ * conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
+ * through one we need to convert to DER again. */
+ if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(sequence, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+ CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+ } else {
+ CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(sequence), CBS_len(sequence));
+ }
+
+ CBS child;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &child, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(&in) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
+ CBS element;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&child, &element, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!handle_element(&element, ctx)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.2 */
+static const uint8_t kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag[] = {
+ 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x02};
+
+/* 1.2.840.113549.1.12.10.1.3 */
+static const uint8_t kCertBag[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
+ 0x01, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x03};
+
+/* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.22.1 */
+static const uint8_t kX509Certificate[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+ 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x16, 0x01};
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_safe_bag parses a single SafeBag element in a PKCS#12
+ * structure. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_safe_bag(CBS *safe_bag, struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+ CBS bag_id, wrapped_value;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &bag_id, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(safe_bag, &wrapped_value,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)
+ /* Ignore the bagAttributes field. */) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag,
+ sizeof(kPKCS8ShroudedKeyBag))) {
+ /* See RFC 7292, section 4.2.2. */
+ if (*ctx->out_key) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&wrapped_value) > LONG_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* |encrypted| isn't actually an X.509 signature, but it has the same
+ * structure as one and so |X509_SIG| is reused to store it. */
+ const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&wrapped_value);
+ X509_SIG *encrypted =
+ d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&wrapped_value));
+ if (encrypted == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inp != CBS_data(&wrapped_value) + CBS_len(&wrapped_value)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *pki =
+ PKCS8_decrypt(encrypted, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
+ X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
+ if (pki == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *ctx->out_key = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pki);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(pki);
+ return ctx->out_key != NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_mem_equal(&bag_id, kCertBag, sizeof(kCertBag))) {
+ /* See RFC 7292, section 4.2.3. */
+ CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_value, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip unknown certificate types. */
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cert_type, kX509Certificate,
+ sizeof(kX509Certificate))) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&cert) > LONG_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
+ X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, (long)CBS_len(&cert));
+ if (!x509) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.1 */
+static const uint8_t kPKCS7Data[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+ 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01};
+
+/* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.6 */
+static const uint8_t kPKCS7EncryptedData[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
+ 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06};
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
+ * PKCS#12 structure. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info,
+ struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+ CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents;
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint8_t *storage = NULL;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+ CBS_len(content_info) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7EncryptedData,
+ sizeof(kPKCS7EncryptedData))) {
+ /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
+ *
+ * PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
+ * encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
+ * RC2-CBC. */
+ CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
+ uint8_t *out;
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo, see
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1 */
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier, see
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 */
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_implicit_string(
+ &eci, &encrypted_contents, &storage,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&contents_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!pkcs8_pbe_decrypt(&out, &out_len, &ai, ctx->password,
+ ctx->password_len, CBS_data(&encrypted_contents),
+ CBS_len(&encrypted_contents))) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ CBS safe_contents;
+ CBS_init(&safe_contents, out, out_len);
+ ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&safe_contents, ctx, PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ } else if (CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+ CBS octet_string_contents;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
+ CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = PKCS12_handle_sequence(&octet_string_contents, ctx,
+ PKCS12_handle_safe_bag);
+ } else {
+ /* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(storage);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
+ CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
+ uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+ size_t der_len;
+ CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
+ uint64_t version;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct pkcs12_context ctx;
+ const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
+
+ /* The input may be in BER format. */
+ if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+ CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+ } else {
+ CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(ber_in), CBS_len(ber_in));
+ }
+
+ *out_key = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+ /* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+ * four. */
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (version < 3) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7. */
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The content type can either be data or signedData. The latter indicates
+ * that it's signed by a public key, which isn't supported. */
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&content_type, kPKCS7Data, sizeof(kPKCS7Data))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx.out_key = out_key;
+ ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
+ ctx.password = password;
+ ctx.password_len = password != NULL ? strlen(password) : 0;
+
+ /* Verify the MAC. */
+ {
+ CBS mac, salt, expected_mac;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ const EVP_MD *md = EVP_parse_digest_algorithm(&mac);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The iteration count is optional and the default is one. */
+ uint64_t iterations = 1;
+ if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
+ iterations > UINT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ if (!pkcs12_key_gen(ctx.password, ctx.password_len, CBS_data(&salt),
+ CBS_len(&salt), PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations,
+ EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, md)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned hmac_len;
+ if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(&authsafes),
+ CBS_len(&authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos. */
+ if (!PKCS12_handle_sequence(&authsafes, &ctx, PKCS12_handle_content_info)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+ if (!ret) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
+ *out_key = NULL;
+ while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
+ X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(void) {}
+
+struct pkcs12_st {
+ uint8_t *ber_bytes;
+ size_t ber_len;
+};
+
+PKCS12 *d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes,
+ size_t ber_len) {
+ PKCS12 *p12;
+
+ p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
+ if (!p12) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
+ if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
+ OPENSSL_free(p12);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
+ p12->ber_len = ber_len;
+ *ber_bytes += ber_len;
+
+ if (out_p12) {
+ PKCS12_free(*out_p12);
+
+ *out_p12 = p12;
+ }
+
+ return p12;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+ size_t used = 0;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ const uint8_t *dummy;
+ static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
+ PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
+
+ buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ if (used == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Workaround a bug in node.js. It uses a memory BIO for this in the wrong
+ * mode. */
+ n = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ used += n;
+
+ if (used < buf->length) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
+ BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
+ ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
+
+out:
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+ BIO *bio;
+ PKCS12 *ret;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
+ if (!bio) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
+ X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
+ CBS ber_bytes;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
+ char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
+
+ if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
+ ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
+ }
+
+ if (!ca_certs) {
+ ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (ca_certs == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ca_certs_alloced = 1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+ if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
+ if (ca_certs_alloced) {
+ sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_cert = NULL;
+ if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) > 0) {
+ *out_cert = sk_X509_shift(ca_certs);
+ }
+
+ if (out_ca_certs) {
+ *out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
+ } else {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_verify_mac(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password,
+ int password_len) {
+ if (password == NULL) {
+ if (password_len != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (password_len != -1 &&
+ (password[password_len] != 0 ||
+ OPENSSL_memchr(password, 0, password_len) != NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, password, &pkey, &cert, NULL)) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ X509_free(cert);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
+ if (p12 == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
+ OPENSSL_free(p12);
+}
