Switch tls13_enc.cc to spans.
The callers become filled with MakeConstSpans, but the various TLS 1.3
secrets will get fixed in a subsequent CL. We do still need a better
pattern for the EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE buffers.
Change-Id: Ide9c173bf0760ecdb8cc45e63969457c20310de2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/37125
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_server.cc b/ssl/tls13_server.cc
index 1e87bb9..7b6f5df 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_server.cc
+++ b/ssl/tls13_server.cc
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
return 0;
}
- return tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, dhe_secret.data(), dhe_secret.size());
+ return tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, dhe_secret);
}
static int ssl_ext_supported_versions_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
@@ -428,11 +428,12 @@
// Set up the key schedule and incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
- if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, hs->new_session->master_key,
- hs->new_session->master_key_length)) {
+ if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(
+ hs, MakeConstSpan(hs->new_session->master_key,
+ hs->new_session->master_key_length))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- } else if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hash_len)) {
+ } else if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hash_len))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -606,8 +607,9 @@
// Derive and enable the handshake traffic secrets.
if (!tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs) ||
- !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
- hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len)) {
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(
+ ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
+ MakeConstSpan(hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -715,10 +717,11 @@
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (!tls13_add_finished(hs) ||
// Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
- !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hs->hash_len) ||
+ !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hs->hash_len)) ||
!tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs) ||
- !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_seal,
- hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len)) {
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(
+ ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_seal,
+ MakeConstSpan(hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -770,8 +773,9 @@
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
- if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_open,
- hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len)) {
+ if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(
+ ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_open,
+ MakeConstSpan(hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->can_early_write = true;
@@ -805,8 +809,9 @@
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
}
}
- if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
- hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len)) {
+ if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(
+ ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
+ MakeConstSpan(hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->tls13_state = ssl->s3->early_data_accepted
@@ -912,8 +917,9 @@
// and derived the resumption secret.
!tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) ||
// evp_aead_seal keys have already been switched.
- !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_open,
- hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len)) {
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(
+ ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_open,
+ MakeConstSpan(hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len))) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}