commit 7061e28dc203a6451e7a9bb2dce39f2751bcf7b3
author David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Thu Mar 19 11:10:48 2015 -0400
committer Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Thu Mar 19 19:54:58 2015 +0000
tree 46f6b4c5beccae339e090c94c361a6216f3fe7c2
parent 3c9746a6d7ccff7d206d110feebba474aaa20f05

Rename EECDH and EDH to ECDHE and DHE.

Align with upstream's renames from a while ago. These names are considerably
more standard. This also aligns with upstream in that both "ECDHE" and "EECDH"
are now accepted in the various cipher string parsing bits.

Change-Id: I84c3daeacf806f79f12bc661c314941828656b04
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

ssl/t1_lib.c

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 627df3f..4086c41 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@
 
       alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
       alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-      if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
+      if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
         using_ecc = 1;
         break;
       }
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@
   int next_proto_neg_seen;
   unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
   unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-  int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+  int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
   using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
 
   /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
@@ -1980,7 +1980,7 @@
    * uncompressed. */
   unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
   unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-  if (((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
+  if (((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
       !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext,
                       SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);