commit 7061e28dc203a6451e7a9bb2dce39f2751bcf7b3
author David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Thu Mar 19 11:10:48 2015 -0400
committer Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Thu Mar 19 19:54:58 2015 +0000
tree 46f6b4c5beccae339e090c94c361a6216f3fe7c2
parent 3c9746a6d7ccff7d206d110feebba474aaa20f05

Rename EECDH and EDH to ECDHE and DHE.

Align with upstream's renames from a while ago. These names are considerably
more standard. This also aligns with upstream in that both "ECDHE" and "EECDH"
are now accepted in the various cipher string parsing bits.

Change-Id: I84c3daeacf806f79f12bc661c314941828656b04
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4053
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

ssl/ssl_lib.c

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index b2fecc7..d710114 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2042,7 +2042,7 @@
     mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
   }
   if (dh_tmp) {
-    mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+    mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
   }
   if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
     mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
@@ -2070,7 +2070,7 @@
   /* If we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC
    * key, check it. */
   if (have_ecdh_tmp && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s)) {
-    mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+    mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
   }
 
   /* PSK requires a server callback. */
@@ -2889,8 +2889,8 @@
       SSL_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
       (s->s3->alpn_selected || s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) &&
       cipher != NULL &&
-      (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEDH ||
-       cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kEECDH) &&
+      (cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kDHE ||
+       cipher->algorithm_mkey == SSL_kECDHE) &&
       (cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM ||
        cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM ||
        cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305);