Check client certificate types in TLS <= 1.2
TLS <= 1.2 servers indicate supported client certificate key types with
a certificate_types field in the CertificateRequest. Historically, we've
just ignored this field, because we've always outsourced certificate
selection to the caller anyway. This meant that, if you configured an
RSA client certificate in response to a server that requested only ECDSA
certificates, we would happily send the certificate and leave it to the
server to decide if it was happy.
Strictly speaking, this was in violation of RFC 5246:
- The end-entity certificate provided by the client MUST contain a
key that is compatible with certificate_types. [...]
Although prior TLS versions didn't say anything useful about this either
way.
Once we move certificate selection into the library, we'll want to start
evaluating supported algorithms ourselves. A natural implementation of
it will, as a side effect, cause us to enforce this match, even when
only a single certificate is configured. Since this is unlikely to have
any real compatibility impact (every TLS server I've seen just hardcodes
this list), let's just try turning it on. On the off chance it does
break someone, I've left a flag, SSL_set_check_client_certificate_type,
for folks to turn this check off. The flag will most likely be
unnecessary, in which case we can retire it after a few months.
If this does cause a problem, we can opt to turn it off for the default
certificate, or only enable it when multiple certificates are
configured, or lean on the sigalgs list (doesn't work for 1.0/1.1), but
these all result in some slightly suboptimal behavior, so I think we
should treat them as contingency plans.
Update-Note: A TLS 1.2 (or below) client, using client certificates,
connecting to a TLS server which doesn't support its certificate type
will now fail the connection slightly earlier, rather than sending the
certificate and waiting for the server to reject it. The connection
should fail either way, but now it will fail earlier with
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE. If the server was buggy and did not
correctly advertise its own capabilities (very very unlikely), this may
cause a connection to fail despite previously succeeding. We have
included a temporary API, SSL_set_check_client_certificate_type, to
disable this behavior in the unlikely event this has any impact, but
please contact the BoringSSL team if you need it, as it will interfere
with improvements down the line.
This change does not affect servers requesting client certificates, only
clients sending them.
Bug: 249
Change-Id: I159bc444c4ee79fbe5c476d4253b48d58d2538be
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/66687
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/internal.h b/ssl/internal.h
index d64f6c4..844c579 100644
--- a/ssl/internal.h
+++ b/ssl/internal.h
@@ -3190,6 +3190,11 @@
// alps_use_new_codepoint if set indicates we use new ALPS extension codepoint
// to negotiate and convey application settings.
bool alps_use_new_codepoint : 1;
+
+ // check_client_certificate_type indicates whether the client, in TLS 1.2 and
+ // below, will check its certificate against the server's requested
+ // certificate types.
+ bool check_client_certificate_type : 1;
};
// From RFC 8446, used in determining PSK modes.
