commit 4dfd5af70191b068aebe567b8e29ce108cee85ce
author David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Fri Jul 19 17:34:37 2019 -0400
committer CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Fri Jul 19 23:31:14 2019 +0000
tree 84f8044fac76430e8d8023a9140006f6dbb84947
parent 9f5c419b9fbb0d10943f14829470130701af2f4b

Only bypass the signature verification itself in fuzzer mode.

Keep the setup_ctx logic, which, among other things, checks if the
signature algorithm is valid. This cuts down on some unnecessary
fuzzer-mode suppressions.

Change-Id: I644f75630791c9741a1b372e5f83ae7ff9f01c2f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/36766
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

ssl/handshake_client.cc

diff --git a/ssl/handshake_client.cc b/ssl/handshake_client.cc
index b0de670..a53e430 100644
--- a/ssl/handshake_client.cc
+++ b/ssl/handshake_client.cc
@@ -1071,13 +1071,8 @@
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
 
-    bool sig_ok = ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
-                                        hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data);
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-    sig_ok = true;
-    ERR_clear_error();
-#endif
-    if (!sig_ok) {
+    if (!ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, signature, signature_algorithm,
+                               hs->peer_pubkey.get(), transcript_data)) {
       // bad signature
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);