Empty signature algorithms in TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest is illegal.
In TLS 1.2, this was allowed to be empty for the weird SHA-1 fallback
logic. In TLS 1.3, not only is the fallback logic gone, but omitting
them is a syntactic error.
struct {
opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
SignatureScheme
supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
Thanks to Eric Rescorla for pointing this out.
Change-Id: I4991e59bc4647bb665aaf920ed4836191cea3a5a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9062
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_client.c b/ssl/tls13_client.c
index c38358d..6199695 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_client.c
+++ b/ssl/tls13_client.c
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@
!CBS_stow(&context, &ssl->s3->hs->cert_context,
&ssl->s3->hs->cert_context_len) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+ CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
!tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);