Forbid interleaving app data in a HelloRequest.
We already forbid renego/app-data interleave. Forbid it within a
HelloRequest too because that's nonsense. No one would ever send:
[hs:HelloReq-] [app:Hello world] [hs:-uest]
Add tests for this case.
This is in preparation for our more complex TLS 1.3 post-handshake logic
which is going to go through the usual handshake reassembly logic and,
for sanity, will want to enforce this anyway.
BUG=83
Change-Id: I80eb9f3333da3d751f98f25d9469860d1993a97a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/9000
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/conn.go b/ssl/test/runner/conn.go
index cefdde3..d01643c 100644
--- a/ssl/test/runner/conn.go
+++ b/ssl/test/runner/conn.go
@@ -1274,6 +1274,20 @@
return nil
}
+func (c *Conn) SendHalfHelloRequest() error {
+ if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ c.out.Lock()
+ defer c.out.Unlock()
+
+ if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, []byte{typeHelloRequest, 0}); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ return c.flushHandshake()
+}
+
// Write writes data to the connection.
func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil {
