Revise signing preferences.
We currently preferentially sign the largest hash available and
advertise such a preference for signatures we accept. We're just as
happy with SHA-256 and, all else equal, a smaller hash would be epsilon
more performant. We also currently claim, in TLS 1.3, we prefer P-384
over P-256 which is off.
Instead order SHA-256 first, next the larger SHA-2 hashes, and leave
SHA-1 at the bottom. Within a hash, order ECDSA > RSA-PSS > RSA-PKCS1.
This has the added consequence that we will preferentially pair P-256
with SHA-256 in signatures we generate instead of larger hashes that get
truncated anyway.
Change-Id: If4aee068ba6829e8c0ef7948f56e67a5213e4c50
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11821
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index c3d39a3..c386499 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -442,62 +442,73 @@
}
/* kVerifySignatureAlgorithms is the default list of accepted signature
- * algorithms for verifying. */
+ * algorithms for verifying.
+ *
+ * For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system
+ * BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized,
+ * restore them. */
static const uint16_t kVerifySignatureAlgorithms[] = {
- /* For now, do not enable RSA-PSS signature algorithms on Android's system
- * BoringSSL. Once TLS 1.3 is finalized and the change in Chrome has stuck,
- * restore them. */
+ /* Prefer SHA-256 algorithms. */
+ SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
#endif
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
+
+ /* Larger hashes are acceptable. */
+ SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
+#endif
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+
/* TODO(davidben): Remove this entry and SSL_CURVE_SECP521R1 from
* kDefaultGroups. */
#if defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
#endif
-
-#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
-#endif
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
- SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
-
-#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
-#endif
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
- SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
-
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
-};
-
-/* kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature
- * algorithms for signing. */
-static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
- /* For now, do not enable RSA-PSS signature algorithms on Android's system
- * BoringSSL. Once TLS 1.3 is finalized and the change in Chrome has stuck,
- * restore them. */
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
#endif
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
- SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
-#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
-#endif
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
- SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
+ /* For now, SHA-1 is still accepted but least preferable. */
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+};
+
+/* kSignSignatureAlgorithms is the default list of supported signature
+ * algorithms for signing.
+ *
+ * For now, RSA-PSS signature algorithms are not enabled on Android's system
+ * BoringSSL. Once the change in Chrome has stuck and the values are finalized,
+ * restore them. */
+static const uint16_t kSignSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
+ /* Prefer SHA-256 algorithms. */
+ SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256,
#endif
SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256,
- SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256,
- SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
+ /* If needed, sign larger hashes.
+ *
+ * TODO(davidben): Determine which of these may be pruned. */
+ SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384,
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384,
+#endif
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384,
+
+ SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512,
+#if !defined(BORINGSSL_ANDROID_SYSTEM)
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512,
+#endif
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512,
+
+ /* If the peer supports nothing else, sign with SHA-1. */
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1,
+ SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
};
size_t tls12_get_verify_sigalgs(const SSL *ssl, const uint16_t **out) {