Fix a number of sigalg scope issues.
peer_sigalgs should live on SSL_HANDSHAKE. This both releases a little
bit of memory after the handshake is over and also avoids the bug where
the sigalgs get dropped if SSL_set_SSL_CTX is called at a bad time. See
also upstream's 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa.
This only affects consumers using the old SNI callback and not
select_certificate_cb.
Add a test that the SNI callback works as expected. In doing so, add an
SSL_CTX version of the signing preferences API. This is a property of
the cert/key pair (really just the key) and should be tied to that. This
makes it a bit easier to have the regression test work with TLS 1.2 too.
I thought we'd fixed this already, but apparently not... :-/
BUG=95
Change-Id: I75b02fad4059e6aa46c3b05183a07d72880711b3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10445
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/handshake_server.c b/ssl/handshake_server.c
index 1d7c7ee..f041129 100644
--- a/ssl/handshake_server.c
+++ b/ssl/handshake_server.c
@@ -1194,13 +1194,12 @@
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
- size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+ size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
goto err;
}
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgs_len; i++) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
goto err;
}
diff --git a/ssl/internal.h b/ssl/internal.h
index 092d14b..660ba79 100644
--- a/ssl/internal.h
+++ b/ssl/internal.h
@@ -907,6 +907,13 @@
uint8_t *public_key;
size_t public_key_len;
+ /* peer_sigalgs are the signature algorithms that the peer supports. These are
+ * taken from the contents of the signature algorithms extension for a server
+ * or from the CertificateRequest for a client. */
+ uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
+ /* num_peer_sigalgs is the number of entries in |peer_sigalgs|. */
+ size_t num_peer_sigalgs;
+
uint8_t session_tickets_sent;
} /* SSL_HANDSHAKE */;
@@ -1030,17 +1037,10 @@
DH *dh_tmp;
DH *(*dh_tmp_cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize);
- /* peer_sigalgs are the algorithm/hash pairs that the peer supports. These
- * are taken from the contents of signature algorithms extension for a server
- * or from the CertificateRequest for a client. */
- uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
- /* peer_sigalgslen is the number of entries in |peer_sigalgs|. */
- size_t peer_sigalgslen;
-
- /* sigalgs, if non-NULL, is the set of digests supported by |privatekey| in
- * decreasing order of preference. */
+ /* sigalgs, if non-NULL, is the set of signature algorithms supported by
+ * |privatekey| in decreasing order of preference. */
uint16_t *sigalgs;
- size_t sigalgs_len;
+ size_t num_sigalgs;
/* Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a
* certificate may be required (client or server). the callback
diff --git a/ssl/s3_both.c b/ssl/s3_both.c
index 30429e5..aa8dea6 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_both.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_both.c
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@
ssl_handshake_clear_groups(hs);
OPENSSL_free(hs->key_share_bytes);
OPENSSL_free(hs->public_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
OPENSSL_free(hs);
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
index 3cfcd8d..f18a62c 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -158,18 +158,6 @@
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
- ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
- ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
-
- if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
- ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
- if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
-
if (cert->x509 != NULL) {
X509_up_ref(cert->x509);
ret->x509 = cert->x509;
@@ -190,6 +178,27 @@
ret->key_method = cert->key_method;
+ ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
+ ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
+
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
+ if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+
+ if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
+ ret->sigalgs =
+ BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0]));
+ if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
+
ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
@@ -228,7 +237,6 @@
DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
- OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
index f74d83c..a5f15f4 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_rsa.c
@@ -336,19 +336,30 @@
ctx->cert->key_method = key_method;
}
-int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
- size_t prefs_len) {
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len = 0;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(prefs, prefs_len * sizeof(prefs[0]));
- if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
+static int set_signing_algorithm_prefs(CERT *cert, const uint16_t *prefs,
+ size_t num_prefs) {
+ cert->num_sigalgs = 0;
+ cert->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(prefs, num_prefs * sizeof(prefs[0]));
+ if (cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len = prefs_len;
+ cert->num_sigalgs = num_prefs;
return 1;
}
+int SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint16_t *prefs,
+ size_t num_prefs) {
+ return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ctx->cert, prefs, num_prefs);
+}
+
+
+int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
+ size_t num_prefs) {
+ return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ssl->cert, prefs, num_prefs);
+}
+
OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) >= 2 * sizeof(uint16_t),
digest_list_conversion_cannot_overflow);
@@ -356,7 +367,7 @@
size_t num_digests) {
OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->sigalgs);
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len = 0;
+ ssl->cert->num_sigalgs = 0;
ssl->cert->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * 2 * num_digests);
if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -369,27 +380,27 @@
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_digests; i++) {
switch (digest_nids[i]) {
case NID_sha1:
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
+ ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
break;
case NID_sha256:
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] =
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
+ ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
break;
case NID_sha384:
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] =
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
+ ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
break;
case NID_sha512:
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->sigalgs_len + 1] =
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
+ ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
- ssl->cert->sigalgs_len += 2;
+ ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
break;
}
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_test.cc b/ssl/ssl_test.cc
index 2493773..5884d93 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_test.cc
+++ b/ssl/ssl_test.cc
@@ -1106,6 +1106,36 @@
PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
}
+static ScopedX509 GetECDSATestCertificate() {
+ static const char kCertPEM[] =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIBzzCCAXagAwIBAgIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC\n"
+ "QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp\n"
+ "dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ\n"
+ "BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l\n"
+ "dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni\n"
+ "v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa\n"
+ "HPUdfvGULUvPciLBo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUq4TSrKuV8IJOFngHVVdf5CaNgtEw\n"
+ "HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUq4TSrKuV8IJOFngHVVdf5CaNgtEwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAJ\n"
+ "BgcqhkjOPQQBA0gAMEUCIQDyoDVeUTo2w4J5m+4nUIWOcAZ0lVfSKXQA9L4Vh13E\n"
+ "BwIgfB55FGohg/B6dGh5XxSZmmi08cueFV7mHzJSYV51yRQ=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+ ScopedBIO bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(kCertPEM, strlen(kCertPEM)));
+ return ScopedX509(PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
+}
+
+static ScopedEVP_PKEY GetECDSATestKey() {
+ static const char kKeyPEM[] =
+ "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+ "MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgBw8IcnrUoEqc3VnJ\n"
+ "TYlodwi1b8ldMHcO6NHJzgqLtGqhRANCAATmK2niv2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4N\n"
+ "Rvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYaHPUdfvGULUvPciLB\n"
+ "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+ ScopedBIO bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(kKeyPEM, strlen(kKeyPEM)));
+ return ScopedEVP_PKEY(
+ PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr));
+}
+
static bool ConnectClientAndServer(ScopedSSL *out_client, ScopedSSL *out_server,
SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *server_ctx,
SSL_SESSION *session) {
@@ -1906,6 +1936,77 @@
return true;
}
+static int SwitchContext(SSL *ssl, int *out_alert, void *arg) {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = reinterpret_cast<SSL_CTX*>(arg);
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, ctx);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static bool TestSNICallback() {
+ ScopedX509 cert = GetTestCertificate();
+ ScopedEVP_PKEY key = GetTestKey();
+ ScopedX509 cert2 = GetECDSATestCertificate();
+ ScopedEVP_PKEY key2 = GetECDSATestKey();
+ if (!cert || !key || !cert2 || !key2) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // At each version, test that switching the |SSL_CTX| at the SNI callback
+ // behaves correctly.
+ for (uint16_t version : kVersions) {
+ if (version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ static const uint16_t kECDSAWithSHA256 = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
+
+ ScopedSSL_CTX server_ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));
+ ScopedSSL_CTX server_ctx2(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));
+ ScopedSSL_CTX client_ctx(SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()));
+ if (!server_ctx || !server_ctx2 || !client_ctx ||
+ !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(server_ctx.get(), cert.get()) ||
+ !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(server_ctx.get(), key.get()) ||
+ !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(server_ctx2.get(), cert2.get()) ||
+ !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(server_ctx2.get(), key2.get()) ||
+ // Historically signing preferences would be lost in some cases with the
+ // SNI callback, which triggers the TLS 1.2 SHA-1 default. To ensure
+ // this doesn't happen when |version| is TLS 1.2, configure the private
+ // key to only sign SHA-256.
+ !SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(server_ctx2.get(),
+ &kECDSAWithSHA256, 1)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_min_version(client_ctx.get(), version);
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_version(client_ctx.get(), version);
+ SSL_CTX_set_min_version(server_ctx.get(), version);
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_version(server_ctx.get(), version);
+ SSL_CTX_set_min_version(server_ctx2.get(), version);
+ SSL_CTX_set_max_version(server_ctx2.get(), version);
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx.get(), SwitchContext);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx.get(), server_ctx2.get());
+
+ ScopedSSL client, server;
+ if (!ConnectClientAndServer(&client, &server, client_ctx.get(),
+ server_ctx.get(), nullptr)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Handshake failed at version %04x.\n", version);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // The client should have received |cert2|.
+ ScopedX509 peer(SSL_get_peer_certificate(client.get()));
+ if (!peer ||
+ X509_cmp(peer.get(), cert2.get()) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Incorrect certificate received at version %04x.\n",
+ version);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
int main() {
CRYPTO_library_init();
@@ -1939,7 +2040,8 @@
!TestRetainOnlySHA256OfCerts() ||
!TestClientHello() ||
!TestSessionIDContext() ||
- !TestSessionTimeout()) {
+ !TestSessionTimeout() ||
+ !TestSNICallback()) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index dbf4313..0b08400 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -594,16 +594,15 @@
* settings. */
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *ssl) {
CERT *c = ssl->cert;
- const uint16_t *sigalgs;
- size_t i, sigalgslen;
int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
c->mask_a = 0;
c->mask_k = 0;
/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA,
* DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
+ const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+ size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
switch (sigalgs[i]) {
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512:
case SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384:
@@ -1130,19 +1129,18 @@
return 1;
}
- const uint16_t *sigalgs_data;
- const size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs_data);
+ const uint16_t *sigalgs;
+ const size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
- CBB contents, sigalgs;
+ CBB contents, sigalgs_cbb;
if (!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &contents) ||
- !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs)) {
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
return 0;
}
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgs_len; i++) {
- if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs, sigalgs_data[i])) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
return 0;
}
}
@@ -1156,9 +1154,9 @@
static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
CBS *contents) {
- OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs);
- ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs);
+ ssl->s3->hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ ssl->s3->hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
if (contents == NULL) {
return 1;
@@ -3025,13 +3023,12 @@
return 1;
}
- CERT *const cert = ssl->cert;
- OPENSSL_free(cert->peer_sigalgs);
- cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
+ OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
+ hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
size_t num_sigalgs = CBS_len(in_sigalgs);
-
if (num_sigalgs % 2 != 0) {
return 0;
}
@@ -3045,18 +3042,16 @@
/* This multiplication doesn't overflow because sizeof(uint16_t) is two
* and we just divided |num_sigalgs| by two. */
- cert->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(uint16_t));
- if (cert->peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
+ hs->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(num_sigalgs * sizeof(uint16_t));
+ if (hs->peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
return 0;
}
- cert->peer_sigalgslen = num_sigalgs;
+ hs->num_peer_sigalgs = num_sigalgs;
CBS sigalgs;
CBS_init(&sigalgs, CBS_data(in_sigalgs), CBS_len(in_sigalgs));
-
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&sigalgs, &cert->peer_sigalgs[i])) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&sigalgs, &hs->peer_sigalgs[i])) {
return 0;
}
}
@@ -3066,7 +3061,7 @@
int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out) {
CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
- size_t i, j;
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
/* Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the
* handshake. It is fixed at MD5-SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for ECDSA. */
@@ -3085,25 +3080,25 @@
}
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
- size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+ size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
sigalgs = cert->sigalgs;
- sigalgs_len = cert->sigalgs_len;
+ num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
}
- const uint16_t *peer_sigalgs = cert->peer_sigalgs;
- size_t peer_sigalgs_len = cert->peer_sigalgslen;
- if (peer_sigalgs_len == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ const uint16_t *peer_sigalgs = hs->peer_sigalgs;
+ size_t num_peer_sigalgs = hs->num_peer_sigalgs;
+ if (num_peer_sigalgs == 0 && ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
/* If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms extension then
* we can assume that it supports SHA1. See
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
static const uint16_t kDefaultPeerAlgorithms[] = {SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1,
SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1};
peer_sigalgs = kDefaultPeerAlgorithms;
- peer_sigalgs_len = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultPeerAlgorithms);
+ num_peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kDefaultPeerAlgorithms);
}
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgs_len; i++) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
uint16_t sigalg = sigalgs[i];
/* SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1 is an internal value and should never be
* negotiated. */
@@ -3112,7 +3107,7 @@
continue;
}
- for (j = 0; j < peer_sigalgs_len; j++) {
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < num_peer_sigalgs; j++) {
if (sigalg == peer_sigalgs[j]) {
*out = sigalg;
return 1;
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_server.c b/ssl/tls13_server.c
index 5bb52f2..48279a7 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_server.c
+++ b/ssl/tls13_server.c
@@ -399,12 +399,12 @@
}
const uint16_t *sigalgs;
- size_t sigalgs_len = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
+ size_t num_sigalgs = tls12_get_psigalgs(ssl, &sigalgs);
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &sigalgs_cbb)) {
goto err;
}
- for (size_t i = 0; i < sigalgs_len; i++) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigalgs; i++) {
if (!CBB_add_u16(&sigalgs_cbb, sigalgs[i])) {
goto err;
}
