)]}'
{
  "commit": "0b8dc3093276336273cd521de36d9f444be6479f",
  "tree": "bd1b475cfbeb79edb37f9946dfa3d351ece5fbaf",
  "parents": [
    "053fee9f79a51d37f4b6d73be2aed0a5e97922b0"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "David Benjamin",
    "email": "davidben@google.com",
    "time": "Sat Dec 17 14:27:16 2016 -0500"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org",
    "email": "commit-bot@chromium.org",
    "time": "Wed Jan 04 13:56:11 2017 +0000"
  },
  "message": "Don\u0027t use BN_mod_inverse for inverses mod p in RSA keygen.\n\nInstead, use BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime of p - 2. This removes two more\ncall sites sensitive to BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. We\u0027re down to just that last\nBN_mod_inverse modulo φ(n). (Sort of. It\u0027s actually not sensitive\nbecause even mod inverses always hit the other codepath. Perhaps we\nshould just leave it alone.)\n\nNote this comes with a slight behavior change. The BN_MONT_CTXs are\ninitialized a little earlier. If a caller calls RSA_generate_* and then\nreaches into the struct to scrap all the fields on it, they\u0027ll get\nconfused. Before, they had to perform an operation on it to get\nconfused. This is a completely ridiculous thing to do.\n\nSince we do this a lot, this introduces some convenience functions for\ndoing the Fermat\u0027s Little Theorem mod inverse and fixes a leak in the\nDSA code should computing kinv hit a malloc error.\n\nBUG\u003d125\n\nChange-Id: Iafcae2fc6fd379d161f015c90ff7050e2282e905\nReviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12925\nReviewed-by: Adam Langley \u003cagl@google.com\u003e\nCommit-Queue: Adam Langley \u003cagl@google.com\u003e\nCQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org \u003ccommit-bot@chromium.org\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
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      "new_path": "crypto/ec/ec_montgomery.c"
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}