| // Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
| // | |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); | |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. | |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at | |
| // | |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 | |
| // | |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software | |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, | |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. | |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and | |
| // limitations under the License. | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/pool.h> | |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "../asn1/internal.h" | |
| #include "../bytestring/internal.h" | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT; | |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = { | |
| ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, issuer, X509_NAME), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, validity, X509_VAL), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, subject, X509_NAME), | |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, key, X509_PUBKEY), | |
| ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1), | |
| ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2), | |
| ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3), | |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF) | |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF) | |
| // x509_new_null returns a new |X509| object where the |cert_info|, |sig_alg|, | |
| // and |signature| fields are not yet filled in. | |
| static X509 *x509_new_null(void) { | |
| X509 *ret = reinterpret_cast<X509 *>(OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(X509))); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret->references = 1; | |
| ret->ex_pathlen = -1; | |
| CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data); | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&ret->lock); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_new(void) { | |
| X509 *ret = x509_new_null(); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret->cert_info = X509_CINF_new(); | |
| ret->sig_alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); | |
| ret->signature = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new(); | |
| if (ret->cert_info == NULL || ret->sig_alg == NULL || | |
| ret->signature == NULL) { | |
| X509_free(ret); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void X509_free(X509 *x509) { | |
| if (x509 == NULL || !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&x509->references)) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, x509, &x509->ex_data); | |
| X509_CINF_free(x509->cert_info); | |
| X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg); | |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(x509->signature); | |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x509->skid); | |
| AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(x509->akid); | |
| CRL_DIST_POINTS_free(x509->crldp); | |
| GENERAL_NAMES_free(x509->altname); | |
| NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(x509->nc); | |
| X509_CERT_AUX_free(x509->aux); | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&x509->lock); | |
| OPENSSL_free(x509); | |
| } | |
| static X509 *x509_parse(CBS *cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) { | |
| CBS cert, tbs, sigalg, sig; | |
| if (!CBS_get_asn1(cbs, &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| // Bound the length to comfortably fit in an int. Lengths in this | |
| // module often omit overflow checks. | |
| CBS_len(&cert) > INT_MAX / 2 || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &tbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || | |
| !CBS_get_asn1_element(&cert, &sigalg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| // For just the signature field, we accept non-minimal BER lengths, though not | |
| // indefinite-length encoding. See b/18228011. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/354): Switch the affected callers to convert the | |
| // certificate before parsing and then remove this workaround. | |
| CBS_ASN1_TAG tag; | |
| size_t header_len; | |
| int indefinite; | |
| if (!CBS_get_any_ber_asn1_element(&cert, &sig, &tag, &header_len, | |
| /*out_ber_found=*/nullptr, | |
| &indefinite) || | |
| tag != CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING || indefinite || // | |
| !CBS_skip(&sig, header_len) || // | |
| CBS_len(&cert) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ret(x509_new_null()); | |
| if (ret == nullptr) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled | |
| // from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based | |
| // functions. | |
| const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&tbs); | |
| if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i((ASN1_VALUE **)&ret->cert_info, &inp, CBS_len(&tbs), | |
| ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), /*tag=*/-1, | |
| /*aclass=*/0, /*opt=*/0, buf) <= 0 || | |
| inp != CBS_data(&tbs) + CBS_len(&tbs)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| inp = CBS_data(&sigalg); | |
| ret->sig_alg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(nullptr, &inp, CBS_len(&sigalg)); | |
| if (ret->sig_alg == nullptr || inp != CBS_data(&sigalg) + CBS_len(&sigalg)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| inp = CBS_data(&sig); | |
| ret->signature = c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(nullptr, &inp, CBS_len(&sig)); | |
| if (ret->signature == nullptr || inp != CBS_data(&sig) + CBS_len(&sig)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| // The version must be one of v1(0), v2(1), or v3(2). | |
| long version = X509_VERSION_1; | |
| if (ret->cert_info->version != nullptr) { | |
| version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(ret->cert_info->version); | |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_VERSION_1| should | |
| // also be rejected here. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1 | |
| // version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted. | |
| if (version < X509_VERSION_1 || version > X509_VERSION_3) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.8, these fields require v2 or v3. | |
| if (version == X509_VERSION_1 && (ret->cert_info->issuerUID != nullptr || | |
| ret->cert_info->subjectUID != nullptr)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| // Per RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9, extensions require v3. | |
| if (version != X509_VERSION_3 && ret->cert_info->extensions != nullptr) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION); | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| return ret.release(); | |
| } | |
| X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) { | |
| X509 *ret = NULL; | |
| if (len < 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len); | |
| ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *inp = CBS_data(&cbs); | |
| err: | |
| if (out != NULL) { | |
| X509_free(*out); | |
| *out = ret; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int i2d_X509(X509 *x509, uint8_t **outp) { | |
| if (x509 == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; | |
| CBB cert; | |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb.get(), 64) || // | |
| !CBB_add_asn1(cbb.get(), &cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): When the rest of the library is decoupled | |
| // from the tasn_*.c implementation, replace this with |CBS|-based functions. | |
| uint8_t *out; | |
| int len = i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, NULL); | |
| if (len < 0 || // | |
| !CBB_add_space(&cert, &out, static_cast<size_t>(len)) || | |
| i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, &out) != len || | |
| !x509_marshal_algorithm(&cert, x509->sig_alg) || | |
| !asn1_marshal_bit_string(&cert, x509->signature, /*tag=*/0)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return CBB_finish_i2d(cbb.get(), outp); | |
| } | |
| static int x509_new_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { | |
| *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)X509_new(); | |
| return *pval != NULL; | |
| } | |
| static void x509_free_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { | |
| X509_free((X509 *)*pval); | |
| *pval = NULL; | |
| } | |
| static int x509_d2i_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, | |
| const ASN1_ITEM *it, int opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { | |
| if (len < 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, *in, len); | |
| if (opt && !CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&cbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, NULL); | |
| if (ret == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *in = CBS_data(&cbs); | |
| X509_free((X509 *)*pval); | |
| *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int x509_i2d_cb(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **out, | |
| const ASN1_ITEM *it) { | |
| return i2d_X509((X509 *)*pval, out); | |
| } | |
| static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_extern_funcs = { | |
| x509_new_cb, | |
| x509_free_cb, | |
| x509_d2i_cb, | |
| x509_i2d_cb, | |
| }; | |
| IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_extern_funcs) | |
| X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509) { | |
| uint8_t *der = NULL; | |
| int len = i2d_X509(x509, &der); | |
| if (len < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *inp = der; | |
| X509 *ret = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(der); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| X509 *X509_parse_from_buffer(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf) { | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf)); | |
| X509 *ret = x509_parse(&cbs, buf); | |
| if (ret == NULL || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | |
| X509_free(ret); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int X509_up_ref(X509 *x) { | |
| CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&x->references); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, | |
| CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { | |
| return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func); | |
| } | |
| int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg) { | |
| return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); | |
| } | |
| void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx) { | |
| return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); | |
| } | |
| // X509_AUX ASN1 routines. X509_AUX is the name given to a certificate with | |
| // extra info tagged on the end. Since these functions set how a certificate | |
| // is trusted they should only be used when the certificate comes from a | |
| // reliable source such as local storage. | |
| X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { | |
| const unsigned char *q = *pp; | |
| X509 *ret; | |
| int freeret = 0; | |
| if (!a || *a == NULL) { | |
| freeret = 1; | |
| } | |
| ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length); | |
| // If certificate unreadable then forget it | |
| if (!ret) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| // update length | |
| length -= q - *pp; | |
| // Parse auxiliary information if there is any. | |
| if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *pp = q; | |
| return ret; | |
| err: | |
| if (freeret) { | |
| X509_free(ret); | |
| if (a) { | |
| *a = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| // Serialize trusted certificate to *pp or just return the required buffer | |
| // length if pp == NULL. We ultimately want to avoid modifying *pp in the | |
| // error path, but that depends on similar hygiene in lower-level functions. | |
| // Here we avoid compounding the problem. | |
| static int i2d_x509_aux_internal(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) { | |
| int length, tmplen; | |
| unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL; | |
| assert(pp == NULL || *pp != NULL); | |
| // This might perturb *pp on error, but fixing that belongs in i2d_X509() | |
| // not here. It should be that if a == NULL length is zero, but we check | |
| // both just in case. | |
| length = i2d_X509(a, pp); | |
| if (length <= 0 || a == NULL) { | |
| return length; | |
| } | |
| if (a->aux != NULL) { | |
| tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp); | |
| if (tmplen < 0) { | |
| if (start != NULL) { | |
| *pp = start; | |
| } | |
| return tmplen; | |
| } | |
| length += tmplen; | |
| } | |
| return length; | |
| } | |
| // Serialize trusted certificate to *pp, or just return the required buffer | |
| // length if pp == NULL. | |
| // | |
| // When pp is not NULL, but *pp == NULL, we allocate the buffer, but since | |
| // we're writing two ASN.1 objects back to back, we can't have i2d_X509() do | |
| // the allocation, nor can we allow i2d_X509_CERT_AUX() to increment the | |
| // allocated buffer. | |
| int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp) { | |
| int length; | |
| unsigned char *tmp; | |
| // Buffer provided by caller | |
| if (pp == NULL || *pp != NULL) { | |
| return i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, pp); | |
| } | |
| // Obtain the combined length | |
| if ((length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, NULL)) <= 0) { | |
| return length; | |
| } | |
| // Allocate requisite combined storage | |
| *pp = tmp = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(length)); | |
| if (tmp == NULL) { | |
| return -1; // Push error onto error stack? | |
| } | |
| // Encode, but keep *pp at the originally malloced pointer | |
| length = i2d_x509_aux_internal(a, &tmp); | |
| if (length <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(*pp); | |
| *pp = NULL; | |
| } | |
| return length; | |
| } | |
| int i2d_re_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) { | |
| asn1_encoding_clear(&x509->cert_info->enc); | |
| return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp); | |
| } | |
| int i2d_X509_tbs(X509 *x509, unsigned char **outp) { | |
| return i2d_X509_CINF(x509->cert_info, outp); | |
| } | |
| int X509_set1_signature_algo(X509 *x509, const X509_ALGOR *algo) { | |
| X509_ALGOR *copy1 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo); | |
| X509_ALGOR *copy2 = X509_ALGOR_dup(algo); | |
| if (copy1 == NULL || copy2 == NULL) { | |
| X509_ALGOR_free(copy1); | |
| X509_ALGOR_free(copy2); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| X509_ALGOR_free(x509->sig_alg); | |
| x509->sig_alg = copy1; | |
| X509_ALGOR_free(x509->cert_info->signature); | |
| x509->cert_info->signature = copy2; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int X509_set1_signature_value(X509 *x509, const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len) { | |
| if (!ASN1_STRING_set(x509->signature, sig, sig_len)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| x509->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); | |
| x509->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| void X509_get0_signature(const ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, const X509_ALGOR **palg, | |
| const X509 *x) { | |
| if (psig) { | |
| *psig = x->signature; | |
| } | |
| if (palg) { | |
| *palg = x->sig_alg; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x) { | |
| return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); | |
| } |