Switch more files to C++.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I2b0c87262a5a529ea264ea8ce2d11c2dba0ec1c8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17766
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_session.cc b/ssl/ssl_session.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cb78cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/ssl_session.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,1144 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+
+
+/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
+ * SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
+ * that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */
+static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock);
+
+SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
+ SSL_SESSION *session = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memset(session, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ session->x509_method = x509_method;
+ session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+ session->references = 1;
+ session->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+ session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+ session->time = time(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&session->ex_data);
+ return session;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ return ssl_session_new(ctx->x509_method);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(SSL_SESSION *session, int dup_flags) {
+ SSL_SESSION *new_session = ssl_session_new(session->x509_method);
+ if (new_session == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ new_session->is_server = session->is_server;
+ new_session->ssl_version = session->ssl_version;
+ new_session->sid_ctx_length = session->sid_ctx_length;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx_length);
+
+ /* Copy the key material. */
+ new_session->master_key_length = session->master_key_length;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->master_key, session->master_key,
+ session->master_key_length);
+ new_session->cipher = session->cipher;
+
+ /* Copy authentication state. */
+ if (session->psk_identity != NULL) {
+ new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(session->psk_identity);
+ if (new_session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (session->certs != NULL) {
+ new_session->certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (new_session->certs == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs); i++) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(session->certs, i);
+ if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(new_session->certs, buffer)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!session->x509_method->session_dup(new_session, session)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ new_session->verify_result = session->verify_result;
+
+ new_session->ocsp_response_length = session->ocsp_response_length;
+ if (session->ocsp_response != NULL) {
+ new_session->ocsp_response = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
+ session->ocsp_response, session->ocsp_response_length);
+ if (new_session->ocsp_response == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length =
+ session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length;
+ if (session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
+ new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
+ session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+ session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length);
+ if (new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->peer_sha256, session->peer_sha256,
+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ new_session->peer_sha256_valid = session->peer_sha256_valid;
+
+ if (session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(session->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = session->peer_signature_algorithm;
+
+ new_session->timeout = session->timeout;
+ new_session->auth_timeout = session->auth_timeout;
+ new_session->time = session->time;
+
+ /* Copy non-authentication connection properties. */
+ if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH) {
+ new_session->session_id_length = session->session_id_length;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->session_id, session->session_id,
+ session->session_id_length);
+
+ new_session->group_id = session->group_id;
+
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->original_handshake_hash,
+ session->original_handshake_hash,
+ session->original_handshake_hash_len);
+ new_session->original_handshake_hash_len =
+ session->original_handshake_hash_len;
+ new_session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
+ new_session->ticket_age_add = session->ticket_age_add;
+ new_session->ticket_max_early_data = session->ticket_max_early_data;
+ new_session->extended_master_secret = session->extended_master_secret;
+
+ if (session->early_alpn != NULL) {
+ new_session->early_alpn =
+ (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(session->early_alpn, session->early_alpn_len);
+ if (new_session->early_alpn == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ new_session->early_alpn_len = session->early_alpn_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the ticket. */
+ if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET) {
+ if (session->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
+ new_session->tlsext_tick =
+ (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(session->tlsext_tick, session->tlsext_ticklen);
+ if (new_session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ new_session->tlsext_ticklen = session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ }
+
+ /* The new_session does not get a copy of the ex_data. */
+
+ new_session->not_resumable = 1;
+ return new_session;
+
+err:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(new_session);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+ ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+
+ /* To avoid overflows and underflows, if we've gone back in time, update the
+ * time, but mark the session expired. */
+ if (session->time > now.tv_sec) {
+ session->time = now.tv_sec;
+ session->timeout = 0;
+ session->auth_timeout = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Adjust the session time and timeouts. If the session has already expired,
+ * clamp the timeouts at zero. */
+ uint64_t delta = now.tv_sec - session->time;
+ session->time = now.tv_sec;
+ if (session->timeout < delta) {
+ session->timeout = 0;
+ } else {
+ session->timeout -= delta;
+ }
+ if (session->auth_timeout < delta) {
+ session->auth_timeout = 0;
+ } else {
+ session->auth_timeout -= delta;
+ }
+}
+
+void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session,
+ uint32_t timeout) {
+ /* Rebase the timestamp relative to the current time so |timeout| is measured
+ * correctly. */
+ ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+
+ if (session->timeout > timeout) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ session->timeout = timeout;
+ if (session->timeout > session->auth_timeout) {
+ session->timeout = session->auth_timeout;
+ }
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session == NULL ||
+ !CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(session->master_key, sizeof(session->master_key));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(session->session_id, sizeof(session->session_id));
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ session->x509_method->session_clear(session);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_hostname);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_tick);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->ocsp_response);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->psk_identity);
+ OPENSSL_free(session->early_alpn);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(session, sizeof(*session));
+ OPENSSL_free(session);
+}
+
+const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
+ unsigned *out_len) {
+ if (out_len != NULL) {
+ *out_len = session->session_id_length;
+ }
+ return session->session_id;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return session->timeout;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ /* NULL should crash, but silently accept it here for compatibility. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return session->time;
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return session->x509_peer;
+}
+
+size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, uint8_t *out,
+ size_t max_out) {
+ /* TODO(davidben): Fix master_key_length's type and remove these casts. */
+ if (max_out == 0) {
+ return (size_t)session->master_key_length;
+ }
+ if (max_out > (size_t)session->master_key_length) {
+ max_out = (size_t)session->master_key_length;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(out, session->master_key, max_out);
+ return max_out;
+}
+
+uint64_t SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, uint64_t time) {
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ session->time = time;
+ return time;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, uint32_t timeout) {
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ session->timeout = timeout;
+ session->auth_timeout = timeout;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
+ size_t sid_ctx_len) {
+ if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ assert(sizeof(session->sid_ctx) < 256);
+ session->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
+ return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) {
+ /* Once the handshake completes we return the established session. Otherwise
+ * we return the intermediate session, either |session| (for resumption) or
+ * |new_session| if doing a full handshake. */
+ if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
+ return ssl->s3->established_session;
+ }
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
+ if (hs->early_session != NULL) {
+ return hs->early_session;
+ }
+ if (hs->new_session != NULL) {
+ return hs->new_session;
+ }
+ return ssl->session;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+ CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+ free_func)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) {
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) {
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_SESSION_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ uint16_t ret;
+ if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&ret, session->ssl_version)) {
+ /* An |SSL_SESSION| will never have an invalid version. This is enforced by
+ * the parser. */
+ assert(0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *SSL_SESSION_get_digest(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return ssl_get_handshake_digest(session->cipher->algorithm_prf,
+ SSL_SESSION_protocol_version(session));
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int is_server) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION *session = ssl_session_new(ssl->ctx->x509_method);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ session->is_server = is_server;
+ session->ssl_version = ssl->version;
+
+ /* Fill in the time from the |SSL_CTX|'s clock. */
+ struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+ ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+ session->time = now.tv_sec;
+
+ uint16_t version = ssl3_protocol_version(ssl);
+ if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* TLS 1.3 uses tickets as authenticators, so we are willing to use them for
+ * longer. */
+ session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout;
+ session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
+ } else {
+ /* TLS 1.2 resumption does not incorporate new key material, so we use a
+ * much shorter timeout. */
+ session->timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+ session->auth_timeout = ssl->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+ }
+
+ if (is_server) {
+ if (hs->ticket_expected || version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* Don't set session IDs for sessions resumed with tickets. This will keep
+ * them out of the session cache. */
+ session->session_id_length = 0;
+ } else {
+ session->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(session->session_id, session->session_id_length)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ session->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, ssl->cert->sid_ctx,
+ ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length);
+ session->sid_ctx_length = ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length;
+
+ /* The session is marked not resumable until it is completely filled in. */
+ session->not_resumable = 1;
+ session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(hs->new_session);
+ hs->new_session = session;
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(SSL *ssl, CBB *out,
+ const uint8_t *session_buf,
+ size_t session_len) {
+ bssl::ScopedEVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ bssl::ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx;
+
+ /* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
+ * connection. */
+ static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead =
+ 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
+ if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) {
+ static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
+ return CBB_add_bytes(out, (const uint8_t *)kTicketPlaceholder,
+ strlen(kTicketPlaceholder));
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
+ * work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->session_ctx;
+ uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t key_name[16];
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx.get(), hctx.get(),
+ 1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
+ !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
+ !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx.get())) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ size_t total = 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
+ total = session_len;
+#else
+ int len;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len, session_buf, session_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ total += len;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), ptr + total, &len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ total += len;
+#endif
+ if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ unsigned hlen;
+ if (!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) ||
+ !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), ptr, &hlen) ||
+ !CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(SSL *ssl, CBB *out,
+ const uint8_t *session_buf,
+ size_t session_len) {
+ const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *method = ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method;
+ const size_t max_overhead = method->max_overhead(ssl);
+ const size_t max_out = session_len + max_overhead;
+ if (max_out < max_overhead) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ if (!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, max_out)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ size_t out_len;
+ if (!method->seal(ssl, ptr, &out_len, max_out, session_buf, session_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TICKET_ENCRYPTION_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_did_write(out, out_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ /* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
+ uint8_t *session_buf = NULL;
+ size_t session_len;
+ if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(session, &session_buf, &session_len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (ssl->session_ctx->ticket_aead_method) {
+ ret = ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_method(ssl, out, session_buf, session_len);
+ } else {
+ ret =
+ ssl_encrypt_ticket_with_cipher_ctx(ssl, out, session_buf, session_len);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(session_buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return session->sid_ctx_length == ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length &&
+ OPENSSL_memcmp(session->sid_ctx, ssl->cert->sid_ctx,
+ ssl->cert->sid_ctx_length) == 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
+ ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
+
+ /* Reject tickets from the future to avoid underflow. */
+ if (now.tv_sec < session->time) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return session->timeout > now.tv_sec - session->time;
+}
+
+int ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+ const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ return ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, session) &&
+ /* The session must have been created by the same type of end point as
+ * we're now using it with. */
+ ssl->server == session->is_server &&
+ /* The session must not be expired. */
+ ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session) &&
+ /* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version. */
+ ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
+ /* Only resume if the session's cipher matches the negotiated one. */
+ hs->new_cipher == session->cipher &&
+ /* If the session contains a client certificate (either the full
+ * certificate or just the hash) then require that the form of the
+ * certificate matches the current configuration. */
+ ((sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs) == 0 &&
+ !session->peer_sha256_valid) ||
+ session->peer_sha256_valid ==
+ ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs);
+}
+
+/* ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets
+ * |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found. The caller takes
+ * ownership of the result. */
+static enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_lookup_session(
+ SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, const uint8_t *session_id,
+ size_t session_id_len) {
+ *out_session = NULL;
+
+ if (session_id_len == 0 || session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
+ return ssl_session_success;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+ /* Try the internal cache, if it exists. */
+ if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ SSL_SESSION data;
+ data.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+ data.session_id_length = session_id_len;
+ OPENSSL_memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, session_id_len);
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+ session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
+ if (session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
+ }
+ /* TODO(davidben): This should probably move it to the front of the list. */
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+ }
+
+ /* Fall back to the external cache, if it exists. */
+ if (session == NULL &&
+ ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ int copy = 1;
+ session = ssl->session_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, (uint8_t *)session_id,
+ session_id_len, ©);
+
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ return ssl_session_success;
+ }
+
+ if (session == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
+ return ssl_session_retry;
+ }
+
+ /* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
+ * (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared
+ * between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy ==
+ * 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */
+ if (copy) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
+ }
+
+ /* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary. */
+ if (!(ssl->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+ SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->session_ctx, session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session != NULL &&
+ !ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session)) {
+ /* The session was from the cache, so remove it. */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->session_ctx, session);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ session = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *out_session = session;
+ return ssl_session_success;
+}
+
+enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_get_prev_session(
+ SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, int *out_tickets_supported,
+ int *out_renew_ticket, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+ assert(ssl->server);
+ SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+ int renew_ticket = 0;
+
+ /* If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present. */
+ const uint8_t *ticket = NULL;
+ size_t ticket_len = 0;
+ const int tickets_supported =
+ !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) &&
+ ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
+ SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
+ client_hello, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &ticket, &ticket_len);
+ if (tickets_supported && ticket_len > 0) {
+ switch (ssl_process_ticket(ssl, &session, &renew_ticket, ticket, ticket_len,
+ client_hello->session_id,
+ client_hello->session_id_len)) {
+ case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
+ break;
+ case ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket:
+ assert(session == NULL);
+ break;
+ case ssl_ticket_aead_error:
+ return ssl_session_error;
+ case ssl_ticket_aead_retry:
+ return ssl_session_ticket_retry;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* The client didn't send a ticket, so the session ID is a real ID. */
+ enum ssl_session_result_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session(
+ ssl, &session, client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len);
+ if (lookup_ret != ssl_session_success) {
+ return lookup_ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *out_session = session;
+ *out_tickets_supported = tickets_supported;
+ *out_renew_ticket = renew_ticket;
+ return ssl_session_success;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ /* Although |session| is inserted into two structures (a doubly-linked list
+ * and the hash table), |ctx| only takes one reference. */
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
+
+ SSL_SESSION *old_session;
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session, session)) {
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (old_session != NULL) {
+ if (old_session == session) {
+ /* |session| was already in the cache. */
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* There was a session ID collision. |old_session| must be removed from
+ * the linked list and released. */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, session);
+
+ /* Enforce any cache size limits. */
+ if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+ while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, session, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock) {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (session != NULL && session->session_id_length != 0) {
+ if (lock) {
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,
+ session);
+ if (found_session == session) {
+ ret = 1;
+ found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
+ }
+
+ if (lock) {
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ }
+
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
+ ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session);
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(found_session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ /* SSL_set_session may only be called before the handshake has started. */
+ if (ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete ||
+ ssl->s3->hs == NULL ||
+ ssl->s3->hs->state != SSL_ST_INIT) {
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ ssl_set_session(ssl, session);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ssl_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (ssl->session == session) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
+ ssl->session = session;
+ if (session != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
+ }
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Historically, zero was treated as |SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT|. */
+ if (timeout == 0) {
+ timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t old_timeout = ctx->session_timeout;
+ ctx->session_timeout = timeout;
+ return old_timeout;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->session_timeout;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t timeout) {
+ ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout;
+}
+
+typedef struct timeout_param_st {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ uint64_t time;
+ LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
+} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
+
+static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) {
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = reinterpret_cast<TIMEOUT_PARAM *>(void_param);
+
+ if (param->time == 0 ||
+ session->time + session->timeout < session->time ||
+ param->time > (session->time + session->timeout)) {
+ /* timeout */
+ /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
+ * save on locking overhead */
+ (void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session);
+ if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
+ param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session);
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint64_t time) {
+ TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
+
+ tp.ctx = ctx;
+ tp.cache = ctx->sessions;
+ if (tp.cache == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ tp.time = time;
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
+ lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
+ CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
+}
+
+/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session->next == NULL || session->prev == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (session->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
+ /* last element in list */
+ if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+ /* only one element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev;
+ session->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
+ /* first element in list */
+ ctx->session_cache_head = session->next;
+ session->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ } else { /* middle of list */
+ session->next->prev = session->prev;
+ session->prev->next = session->next;
+ }
+ }
+ session->prev = session->next = NULL;
+}
+
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ if (session->next != NULL && session->prev != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
+ ctx->session_cache_head = session;
+ ctx->session_cache_tail = session;
+ session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ session->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
+ } else {
+ session->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
+ session->next->prev = session;
+ session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
+ ctx->session_cache_head = session;
+ }
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
+ ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return ctx->new_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
+ ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *session) {
+ return ctx->remove_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
+ uint8_t *id, int id_len,
+ int *out_copy)) {
+ ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(
+ SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id, int id_len, int *out_copy) {
+ return ctx->get_session_cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(
+ SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
+ ctx->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
+ int value) {
+ return ctx->info_callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
+ ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
+}
+
+void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
+ return ctx->channel_id_cb;
+}
